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DILUTING JUSTICE ON APPEAL?: AN EXAMINA·
TION OF THE USE OF DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES SITTING BY DESIGNATION ON THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
Richard B. Saphire •
Michael E. Solimine**
According to a number of studies and commentators, a serious caseload crisis faces the federal courts. With respect to the federal courts
of appeals, some have called for drastic remedial measures. Until
Congress responds, the courts of appeals have been forced to adopt
a range of coping measures. In this article, Professors Saphire and
Solimine examine one of these measures, the utilization ofdesignated district court judges on appellate panels. After discussing the origins and extent of this practice, they identify a number ofproblems
it raises. They argue that extensive and routine utilization of
district judges on appellate panels has the potential to adversely
affect important goals of judicial administration, including the
maintenance of collegiality and the.consistency of precedent. They
also argue that, by treating district and circuit judges as fungible,
current designation practice calls into question the rationality of
the federal judicial appointment process and threatens to undermine
the quality of appellate justice.
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[W]e subtly undermine the constitutional system when we
treat federal judges as fungible. 1
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, more and more people have questioned the
capacity of the federal court system to do the work Congress
has assigned to it. In his yearly reports to Congress, the current Chief Justice of the United States has expressed concern
that the federal courts are approaching the point at which they
will not be able to process the cases stacking up on their burgeoning dockets fairly and efficiently. 2 Similarly, a recent study
of the federal court system concluded that the federal appellate
courts are in a "crisis of volume" with "swollen caseloads"
which, if left unattended, threaten to undermine the "hallmarks of our judiciary. "3
A number of remedies have been proposed to alleviate this
problem. These proposals include changes to the en bane procedures of the federal courts of appeals, development of new
case management techniques, and a range of fundamental
"structural alternatives."4 Also prominent have been proposals
for the expansion of the number of authorized district and
circuit court judgeships. 5
1.
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 604 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2.
See William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1994,
at 1, 1.
3.
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REl'ORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 8TuDY COMMI'ITEE
109 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 STUDY COMMITl'EE REPORT); see also THOMAS E. BAKER,
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PRoBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 31-51
(1994) (detailing past efforts to acknowledge and analyze the "crisis of volume" in
the circuit courts); JUDITH A MCKENNA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF Al'PEALs 17-35 (1993) (describing the dramatic increase in appellate caseloads).
4.
1990 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 114-31; see also J. Clifford
Wallace, Tackling the Caseload Crisis, 80 AB.A. J. 88 (June 1994) (calling for a
careful examination of"new federal law and its impact on the federal court system").
5.
1990 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 111-12 (calling upon the
Judicial Conference of the United States to "develop and adopt a weighted caseload
formula for determining needed appellate judgeships" and urging that Congress
"quickly provide the additional appellate judgeships that the Judicial Conference has
requested"). For a recent, extensive study ofremedies that have been proposed to deal
with the caseload crisis, see BAKER, supra note 3. For a discussion of the federal court
caseload crunch and a critical view of the notion that it should be addressed by
expanding the number of courts, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining
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The questions of whether a caseload crisis exists, what the
extent of this supposed caseload crisis is, and how many, if
any, new judgeships would alleviate it have sparked a lively
and public debate among a number of prominent judges of the
federal courts of appeals. For example, in a recent article
published in the American Bar Association Journal, Judge
Stephen Reinhardt of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit asserted that "our federal court system is too
small for the job. "6 Focusing specifically on the courts of
appeals, Judge Reinhardt observed that "[t]hose who believe
we are doing the same quality work that we did in the past are
simply fooling themselves. We adopt more and more procedures
for 'expediting' cases, procedures that ensure that individual
cases will get less attention."7 Judge Reinhardt described these
procedures, including dispensing with oral argument, as ensuring that "many cases do not get the full attention they
deserve" and argued that the procedures undercut the goal of
providing for a "first-class federal court system. "8 His proposed
solution to the problem was "simply that Congress double the
size of the courts of appeals. "9

the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 69-74. See also Robert H. Bork,
Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976) (determining
that the "crisis" facing the federal courts is "simply overload, an overload so serious
that the integrity of the federal system is threatened," and recommending a reallocation of disputes among different tribunals).
6.
Stephen Reinhardt, 7bo Few Judges, 7bo Many Cases: A Plea to Save the
Federal Courts, 79 A.B.A. J. 52, 52 (Jan. 1993).
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 53. Judge Reinhardt noted that, even if Congress were to adopt his
proposal,
our present stream of cases would be more than enough to keep us busy with
a full workload. The only difference would be that far more of the cases we are
now handling would receive the full attention they deserve, and the quality of
justice in our courts would be substantially improved.

Id. It should be noted that Judge Reinhardt's proposal was, according to a judicial
colleague, "precipitated in part by the request of the [Ninth] Circuit . . . for an
additional 10 judges, and by pending legislation that will substantially increase the
federal caseload." Dolores K. Sloviter, The Judiciary Needs Judicious Growth, NAT'L
L.J., June 28, 1993, at 17.
In response to the attention drawn to the growing volume of cases in the federal
circuit courts, some commentators have suggested the possibility of making structural
modifications to the federal court system, including the consolidation of circuits, the
creation of circuit courts whose jurisdiction is defined by subject matter, and the
establishment of a national court of appeals. See, e.g., Randall Samborn, Big Change
in Judiciary Rejected, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7, 1994, at 3 (discussing a study conducted by
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Judge Reinhardt's proposal sparked a number of spirited
responses from within the federal judiciary. For example,
Chief Judge Dolores Sloviter of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed that "[s)ome growth of
the federal courts is both necessary and inevitable." 10 She expressed concern, however, that a rapid expansion of the size
of the federal circuit courts might adversely affect the collegiality essential to the harmonious and effective operation of the
appellate process and instead proposed incremental increases
in the number of circuit judges, "limited to 15 percent to 20
percent every three years." 11
Judge Jon 0. Newman, now Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, also joined the debate
about the severity of the caseload glut facing the federal
courts. 12 Judge Newman agreed that the federal courts were
facing a serious problem in terms of their capacity to manage
adequately their growing dockets. 13 However, like Judge
Sloviter, he cautioned against a precipitous and massive increase in the size of the federal courts of appeals, arguing that
an enlarged federal judiciary would lead to a range of serious
problems. 14
More specifically, Judge Newman conceded that the continued growth of federal caseloads would result in "an inevitable
decline in the quality of decision-making" in the courts of
appeals. 15 Yet he was skeptical that a significant increase in
the number of federal judges would improve the situation. 16

the Federal Judicial Center that examines proposals and analyzes problems facing
the circuit courts). Judge Reinhardt finds such suggestions superfluous:" 'We don't
need more studies about structure. What we need are more judges to handle the
cases.' " Id. at 40.
10. Sloviter, supra note 9, at 18.
11. Id.
12. Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary,
76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993).
13. See id. at 188.
14. Id. at 187-94. Among the problems identified by Judge Newman were a
reduction in the quality of judicial nominees, the impairment of the ability of each
court of appeals to function, a fragmentation of the circuits, the "inevitable decline
in the coherence of a body offederal law," and "an impairment in the quality of decision
making: Id. at 188.
15. Id. at 194.
16. Id. Similar concerns were expressed by Judge Gerald Tjoflat, Chief Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Gerald B. Tjoflat, More
Judges, Less Justice, 79 A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (July 1993) (arguing in response to Judge
Reinhardt's comments that "the problem for most circuits is not that they have too
few judges, but that they have too many"); see also COMM. ON LoNG RANGE PLANNING,
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Consequently, he advocated that a more effective solution
would be to curtail the jurisdiction of federal courts in areas
where cases could sensibly be diverted to the state courts. 17 If
the number of federal judges ·were to be increased, Judge
Newman proposed an overall limit of 1000 judges. 18
While not every commentator accepts the assertion that the
federal courts are faced with a serious caseload crisis, 19 no one
has suggested that the current state of the federal judiciary is
ideal. For a long time, the federal court system has been asked
to do more than many judges and scholars believe it is able to
do. Typically, when Congress has enacted new systems of
regulation broadening the jurisdiction or otherwise expanding
the workload of the federal courts, it has failed to expand
concomitantly the resources available to the courts to meet
these new responsibilities. 20

US. JUDICIAL C.ONFERENCE, PRoPOSED U>NG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL C.OURI'S 42, 123
(2d prtg. 1995) [hereinafter PROPOSED LoNG RANGE PLAN) (cautioning that growth of
the size of the current federal courts may undermine collegiality among the judges
and lead to inconsistency and incoherence in circuit law).
17. Newman, supra note 12, at 194.
18. Id. Currently, there are 167 authorized federal appellate judgeships, excluding the Federal Circuit. PROPOSED LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 16, at 15. See
generally 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (Supp. V 1993) (congressional authorization of circuit
court judgeships). For an argument that an expanded federal judiciary could give rise
to adverse consequences, see Jon 0. Newman, Are 1,000 Federal Judges Enough?:
Yes. More Would Dilute the Quality, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1993, at A17. Judge
Reinhardt responded to Judge Newman's plea for a 1000-judge cap by arguing that
"[t)hose who would freeze the number of Federal judgeships at 1,000 have their
priorities backward. Only after we decide on the proper role of the courts can we
determine their proper size." Stephen Reinhardt, Are 1,000 Federal Judges Enough?:
No. More Cases Should Be Heard, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1993, at Al 7. Several others
also have argued against significantly increasing the number of Article Ill judges. See
1990 STUDY COMMl'M'EE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8; Richard A. Posner, Coping with
the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates and Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216
(1989).
19. At the close of his article calling for a significant expansion of the federal
courts, Judge Reinhardt acknowledged that "[t)here are members of my own court
who would disagree strongly with everything I have said." Reinhardt, supra note 6,
at 54.
One recent study, while noting that there had been "a tremendous growth in
filings in the past 50 years," found that a majority of federal appellate judges
responding to a questionnaire did not believe that they were overwhelmed by their
workload. Michael C. Gizzi, Examining the Crisis of Volume in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 96, 96 (1993). The author of the study concluded that "little
empirical evidence supports the claim that the courts of appeals are in a crisis of
volume." Id. at 103.
20. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 224-27 (describing demands that Congress better
define legislation in order to aid adjudication).
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This is not to say that Congress has completely ignored the
need for additional adjudicatory mechanisms to enforce federal
rights or the promption of other federal interests. For example,
the creation of the federal magistrate system and the expansion ofthe magistrates' responsibilities were intended in part
to provide a measure of relief to federal districtjudges. 21 Similarly, the expansion of adjudicatory mechanisms outside of
Article III of the Constitution-in the form of adjudicatory systems within federal agencies and so-called "Article I"
courts22-has allowed Congress to divert cases away from the
federal court system, or at least to adjust the timing and scope
of any necessary action by the regular federal courts. 23 Nevertheless, if the ongoing expression of criticism and concern is
any indication, none .of these efforts has been fully successful
in ameliorating the problem of an overextended federal judiciary.
Most contemporary criticism of the federal court system, especially as it relates to conditions in the federal courts of
appeals, has ignored an important fact: the ability of circuit
court judges to process their cases in an expeditious and
efficient manner is actually much worse than is generally realized. This becomes clear once one realizes that federal circuit
judges-those men and women nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate for vacancies on the twelve regional
courts of appeals, the District of Columbia Circuit, and the
Federal Circuit-are not the only persons who decide cases filed
in the circuit courts. Indeed, each year a significant number of
federal appellate cases are decided by three-judge panels consisting of one or more judges who were neither appointed by
the President nor confirmed by the Senate to perform the
federal appellate function. 24
Who are these persons who help the existing federal appellate system to do its work? Who are these persons who function
as federal appellate judges, who exercise many of the constitutional and statutory functions of circuit judges, but who have
21. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 228 (2d ed. 1994).
22. "Article I," or "legislative," courts are created by Congress pursuant to its
enumerated powers. See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up
Article Ill: Legislatiue Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV.
85, 85-86 & n.3 (1988).
23. See generally id. (analyzing Supreme Court attempts to find boundaries to
Congress's power to create non-Article Ill courts and proposing a framework with
which to assess such courts).
·
24. See infra Part II.A.
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not been purposefully selected or formally approved to do the
work assigned them? Are they interlopers whose presence on
federal appellate panels presents a threat to the integrity of
the federal judicial system as established and understood by
the Constitution?25 Does the presence of these persons on federal appellate panels allow Congress to avoid what many see
as its neglected duty to address in a more coherent, systematic,
and rational way the crisis in administration that faces the
federal courts?26
Identifying these surrogate·circuitjudges is the easy part of
this riddle. During the last decade, the federal circuit courts
have, with increasing frequency, come to rely upon federal district judges to sit "by designation"27 on appellate panels. 28
Responding to the other parts of the riddle, however, is more
difficult. The utilization of district court judges in the circuit
courts has received little study or analysis, either by those
charged with the responsibility of administering the federal
court system or by the scholarly community. 29

25. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
26. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 228 (summarizing the extramural reforms in the
courts of appeals that Congress has used in the past but which are no longer sufficient).
27.
In reported decisions of the federal circuit courts, opinions frequently refer
to district court judges, and, for that matter, visiting circuit court judges, as sitting
"by designation." See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 986 F.2d 1026, 1028 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 271 (1993). The person who "designates" the visiting judge to
sit is usually the Chief Judge or, by proxy, the clerk or executive officer of the circuit.
See 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988); infra Part I.B.
28. The federal circuits have also made extensive use of visiting judges, both
active and senior, from other circuits. See MCKENNA, supra note 3, at 38-39. Since
these judges were nominated and confirmed as circuit judges, however, they present
different and, in our view, less serious concerns than those presented by the use of
district court judges. Accordingly, our discussion will focus almost exclusively on the
utilization of federal district judges on appellate panels.
29.
For example, the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee failed to
mention the utilization of district judges in its chapter entitled "Dealing with the
Appellate Caseload Crisis." 1990 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 109-31.
On the other hand, the United States Judicial Conference's proposed long-range plan
for the federal courts notes that there will be a "growing need for visiting circuit,
district, magistrate, and bankruptcy judges to provide temporary assistance" in
handling the ever-increasing workload of the federal courts. PROPOSED LoNG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 16, at 95. In a section containing recommendations for "restructuring
appellate review," however, the plan makes no explicit mention of the practice of
utilizing designated district judges in the circuit courts. Id. at 123-24. Instead, the
report considers, somewhat unfavorably, "expanding the role of adjunct judicial
officers, such as appellate commissioners," and suggests the creation of an" 'appellate
division' at the district level." Id. at 123. Similarly, in identifying recent methods
adopted by the federal circuits to deal with their caseload crisis, Chief Judge J.
Clifford Wallace of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit mentioned
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This article analyzes the effects of and problems associated
with district judges sitting by designation. Part I provides
some background for analyzing the current utilization of
district judges in the circuit courts. After briefly describing the
statutory and historical context for the practice, we discuss the
diverse designation policies of the federal circuits and the
rationales that are cited most frequently for those policies.
Part II presents and analyzes available data concerning the
extent to which district judges have been utilized on appellate
panels in recent years. This Part also discusses the available
data on the appellate voting behavior of district judges in
order to determine whether the participation of district judges
on appellate panels measurably affects the disposition of cases
decided by the circuit courts. Part III begins to address a set
of potential problems caused by the circuit courts' extensive
utilization of district judges sitting by designation. These problems include the enhanced prospect for inconsistency in precedent and legal doctrine; the potential upheaval that frequent
utilization of district judges can present to the collegiality
within a circuit; the possibility that district judges may feel
more constrained in exercising independent judgment than
their circuit judge counterparts; and the potential for district
judge participation to lead to greater pressure on the circuits
to grant en bane review of panel decisions.
Finally, Part IV addresses a significant conceptual problem
presented by what is now a relatively common practice of the
circuit courts' reliance on district judges in order to manage
their overburdened dockets. To the extent that the current
practice treats all federal judges as fungible, it ignores what
we suggest are important distinctions between the trial and
appellate functions and between the kinds of persons who are
likely to be best suited to perform these functions. We argue
that the rationality of the process of staffing the federal courts
must be measured by its effectiveness in scrutinizing the qualifications of personnel to perform the particular tasks they are
assigned. When district judges are asked routinely to exercise

only that the circuit courts "hear fewer oral arguments, publish fewer opinions and
rely more heavily on law clerks and staff attorneys." Wallace, supra note 4, at 88.
The utilization of district court judges by the federal courts of appeals has not
completely escaped scholarly analysis. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 3, at 172 n.84, 199
(studying the problems facing the circuit courts and making passing references to the
utilization of district judges). Most of these discussions are focused on specific issues
raised by the practice and tend to be quite dated. See discussion infra Part II.
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the power of reviewing the decisions of other district judges,
they exercise a function that they presumably were not nominated, confirmed, or appointed to perform. Although reliance
on district judges may provide a short-term solution to the
docket congestion now facing the circuit courts, we argue that
this reliance has hidden costs that policymakers have not considered. Not the least significant of these costs is the possible
dilution of justice on appeal.
I. UTILIZING DISTRICT JUDGES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURTS: AUTHORITY AND RATIONALE

A. Statutory Authority
The story of district judges sitting by designation on the
courts of appeals begins with the history of appellate courts.
Because the history of the present courts of appeals and their
predecessor courts are treated in detail elsewhere, 30 only a
broad outline of this history will be sketched here.
Intermediate federal appellate courts have existed in pure
form for only a little over a century. Prior to that, the Judiciary Act of 178931 created "circuit courts" in addition to the
"district" or trial courts. 32 The circuit courts exercised jurisdiction resembling that of the present courts of appeals. 33 A
principal difference was the composition of the circuit courts,
which were composed of judges who sat permanently on other
courts. 34 These courts met intermittently and usually consisted
of two Supreme Court justices ("riding circuit") and a district
judge.35 This institutional arrangement led to dissatisfaction
for a number of reasons, including the great time and travel
burden it imposed on judges. 36 There was apparently little or
no concern about the problematic arrangement of appellate

See, e.g., PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HARr AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND
SYSTEM 30-39 (3d ed. 1988); 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3501-3510 (2d ed. 1984).
31. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (partially repealed 1911 and partially
codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
32. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. 7S-79.
33. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 30, at 35.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id.

30.

THE FEDERAL
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justice meted by judges on assignment from elsewhere, including some who were hearing appeals from their own decisions. 37
These logistical difficulties, coupled with the increased caseloads of the circuit courts, grew worse in the decades after the
Civil War and provided the impetus for the passage of the
Evarts Act in 1891,38 which established the present courts of
appeals, staffed by permanentjudges. 39 From the earliest date,
however, district judges were authorized to sit by designation
as visiting judges on the new courts of appeals. 40 This authorization is now codified in section 292 of the Judicial Code, which
permits the Chief Justice of the United States or the chief
judge of a circuit. to "designate and assign temporarily" a district judge to a circuit. 41 Section 292 is silent about the procedures that these individuals should employ in designating
district judges as visitors, leaving it largely to individual circuit
practice. 42
37.
District judges apparently were allowed to hear appeals from their own
decisions until 1891. See Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (1891) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1988)) (prohibiting the practice); see also Del Vecchio v.
Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994) (en bane)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting that the practice of judges hearing appeals from
their own decisions was not thought to be constitutionally suspect before the practice
was abolished). See generally 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, at§ 3545 (describing
§ 47 as a "much-needed reform").
38. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 30, at 38.
39. See Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). The old circuit courts continued
to exist until they were abolished formally by the Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36
Stat. 1087 (codified as amended in scattered sections of28 U.S.C.). BATOR ET AL., supra
note 30, at 39.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 292, Historical and Revision Notes (1988) (describing the
evolution and history of statutory authority for district judges sitting by designation
at the appellate level).
It is also worth noting that.a number of specialized Article III courts in this century
have been composed of both circuit and district judges. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 209(b), 87 Stat. 985, 999 (1974) (codified at 45
U.S.C. § 719(b)) (establishing the Special Court); Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 21l(b), 85 Stat. 743, 749 (expired 1974) (creating
the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
ch. 26, § 204(c), 56 Stat. 23, 32, am.ended by Inflation Control Act of 1942, ch. 578,
56 Stat. 765 (terminated June 30, 1947, by the Act of July 25, 1946, ch. 671, § 1, 60
Stat. 664) (establishing the Emergency Court of Appeals). These courts are discussed
in Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, SpecializedAdjudication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 393-400.
41.
28 U.S.C. § 292(a), (d) (1988).
42.
Section 292 has been amended a number of times since 1948, but in no substantive way affecting the issues addressed in this Article. In the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, however, Congress did
amend § 46 of the Judicial Code, and the amendment has the potential to impact
§ 292. The amendment to§ 46(b) requires that separate panels of circuit courts consist
"of three judges, at least a majority of whom shall be judges of that court, unless ...
the chief judge of that court certifies that there is an emergency." 28 U.S.C. § 46(b)
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B. Circuit Policies and Rationales for Utilization
In 1993, in an effort to document how the circuits employ
the assignment authorized by section 292, we sent questionnaire letters to the chief judges and circuit executives of all
the courts of appeals. Among the questions asked by the letters were whether there was any formal policy regarding the
use of district judges by designation, the extent ~o which each
circuit utilized district judges, and the rationale for such use. 43
The chief judge, the circuit executive, or both responded from
each of the courts of appeals. 44
Every circuit indicated that it had no formal policy regarding district judges sitting by designation. In other words, no
circuit had implemented any policy in its local rules, internal
operating procedures, or other widely disseminated document.
Instead, each circuit asked district judges to serve through its
office of the chief judge or circuit executive. If the district
judges agreed, the circuits assigned the judges on an informal
basis.
The responses to our correspondence described the functions
thought to be served by district judges sitting by designation.
One goal was to orient and educate newly appointed district
judges; the belief was that district judges would familiarize
themselves with federal judicial practice and judicial personnel on the appellate level by sitting with appellate judges. 45
(1988). The amendment expressed congressional concern over the "instability and
unpredictability in the law of a circuitn that might result if many panels included
judges from outside the circuit. In re Bongiorno, 694 F.2d 917, 918-19 n.l (2d Cir.
1982). The language of the amendment might be read to prevent district judges from
sitting if such judges were not considered "judges of that [circuit) courtn and depending on whether one of the other judges was from outside the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b).
Apparently, this precise issue has not been addressed in a published opinion. Courts
have held that senior circuit judges fall within "judges of that court.n Cone Corp. v.
Hillsborough County, 995 F.2d 185, 186 (11th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (per curiam);
Bongiorno, 694 F.2d at 918 n.l. These holdings suggest that district judges also may
be considered "judges of that courtn within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 46(b). Thus,
the use of district judges sitting by designation may not violate the statute. Even if
this practice does violate the statute, that violation may be overcome by the declaration of a judicial emergency.
43.
The letters also asked for statistical information and about the use, if any,
of district judges in the en bane process. Those matters are addressed in this Article
in Parts II.A and III.A, respectively.
44.
The responses are on file with the authors and with the Uniuersity of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
45. See letter from Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of Court, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Richard B. Saphire (July 19, 1993) [hereinafter
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This would presumably result in more collegiality among trial
and appellate judges and would teach both sides the realities
of decision-making in their respective courts, which, in theory,
would lead to more informed decision-making. 46
Another reason for utilizing district judges is to aid in
dealing with the heavy workload of the appellate court. 47
Increasing the number of judicial personnel available increases the number of three-judge panels able to hear cases. Section
292(d) authorizes the Chief Justice of the United States to
assign district judges from one circuit to serve temporarily on
the appellate panels of another circuit "upon presentation of
a certificate of necessity,"48 and our correspondents have related their experiences with such declarations of necessity. 49
Virtually all of the circuits, however, stated or implied that
district judges were being used routinely to deal with heavy
appellate work caused by numerous appeals or by unfilled

Ninth Circuit letter] (policy is to invite new appointees as "part of their orientation
to the Ninth Circuit"); letter from Michael E. Gans, Clerk of Court, United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to Richard B. Saphire 1 (July 28, 1993)
[hereinafter Eighth Circuit letter] (new district judges are invited so that they can
"learn the operation of the circuit court"); letter from Jon 0. Newman, Chief Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Richard B. Saphire 1 (July
19, 1993) (invitations are extended to neophyte district judges to allow them to
"become familiar with Court of Appeals' practice"); letter from Samuel W. Phillips,
Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to Richard
B. Saphire 1 (July 7, 1993) (explaining the unwritten policy that "new district judges
are routinely invited to sit"); letter from Henry A. Politz, Chief Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to Richard B. Saphire (July 22, 1993) [hereinafter Fifth Circuit letter] (the use of district judges on appellate panels is to "introduce new district judges to the appellate process"); letter from Toby D. Slawsky,
Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to Richard
B. Saphire 1 (Aug. 24, 1993) (participation of designated judges is an "opportunity to
familiarize these new district judges"); letter from Norman E. Zoller, Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, to Richard B. Saphire
2 (July 6, 1993) [hereinafter Eleventh Circuit letter] (explaining that the goal is to
"acquaint these district judges with the appellate process").
46.
Past authors have also noted that seating district judges by designation
serves an educational or orientational function, but that the primary emphasis
remains on educating the district judges, not the appellate judges. See, e.g., Stephen
L. Wasby, •Extra" Judges in a Federal Appellate Court: The Ninth Circuit, 15 LAW &
Soc'v REV. 369, 378-80 (1980-1981) (examining Ninth Circuit appellate judges' views
of district judges sitting by designation).
47. See, e.g., id. at 378 (finding that Ninth Circuit judges considered workload
reduction to be a benefit of district judges sitting by designation).
48.
28 u.s.c. § 292(d) (1988).
49. E.g., Fifth Circuit letter, supra note 45. As of July 22, 1993, the Fifth Circuit
had been in a judicial emergency for two years. Id.
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vacancies. 50 Thus it seems that, in many circuits, district judges
have become an institutional response to appellate workload
concerns.

II. UTILIZING DISTRICT JUDGES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURTS: EMPffiICAL PERSPECTIVES

In this section, we discuss empirical evidence pertaining to
the current practice of utilizing district judges on courts of
appeals. First, we address how widespread this practice has
become. Second, we consider how the appellate voting behavior
of district judges, considered in the aggregate, compares to that
of permanent appellate judges.
A. Frequency of Use of District Judges
Sitting by Designation

In recent years, the use of district judges sitting by designation has become frequent in some circuits;51 just how frequent,
however, is somewhat difficult to determine. Past studies,
surveying publish~d cases, reported that up to thirty or forty
percent of appellate panels have at least one visiting judge, ·
either district or appellate or both. 52 The danger with this
methodology is that officially published opinions may not be a
fair sample of the actual work being conducted by panels in the

50. See id. (describing the shortage in judges and the increasing number of appeals); letter from James A. Higgins, Circuit Executive, United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to Richard B. Saphire 1 (July 1, 1993) (same); memorandum from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to Visiting
Judges 1(July15, 1993) (thanking visiting judges for "help[ing] us in our work load•)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Eleventh Circuit
Letter, supra note 45, at 1 (referring to reason of "heavy caseload").
51. See tbl. 1, infra p. 365.
52. ~ e.g., RlCHARD A PosNER, THE FEDERAL COURI'S: Cmsls AND REFoRM 101 (1985)
(reporting that 31 % of panels in 1983 had visiting judges, as compared to 22% in 1960,
based on sample of cases in published appellate decisions); Samuel Estreicher,
Conserving the Federal Judiciary for a Conservative Agenda?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 569,
573 n.12 (1986) (reviewing POSNER, supra) (utilizing a similar sample and obtaining
figures of 35% and 5% in 1985 and 1965, respectively); Justin J. Green & Burton M.
Atkins, Designated Judges: How Well Do They Perform?, 61 JUDICATURE 358, 363 (1978)
(surveying all reported appellate opinions between 1965 and 1969 and reporting that
47% included a designated judge).
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circuit. 53 A better source of data is one that captures all panel
decisions by a circuit in a given period of time.
A more comprehensive source of data on this matter is found
in the various issues of the Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The Report
contains information on the courts of appeals' utilization of
senior and active district judges by designation,54 and some of
those data are found in Table 1 on the following page. Table 1
includes all of the courts of appea:ls-except for the Federal Circuit-from 1984 through 1992.
Table 1 verifies the conventional wisdom suggesting the increased use of district judges sitting by designation and the
increased number of appeals on the merits in which they participate. Though there were dips in 1992 and 1993, in the last
ten years the share of appellate dispositions in which a district
judge participated was around eighteen to twenty percent. From
this we can infer that, in the past ten years, about one-fifth of
the panel decisions in the courts of appeals, taken as a whole,
have utilized at least one district judge.55

53. See generally Lauren K Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Gouernment Litigants in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 87
MICH. L. REv. 940 (1989) (examining selective publication of appellate opinions);
Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals:
Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307 (1990) (analyzing the
substance of unpublished opinions).
54. 1984-1992 AD MIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. tbl. V-2 [hereinafter
ADMIN. OFFICE ANN. REP.]. The reports prior to 1984 contain a table V-2 on the use of
designated judges, but only list the names of the judges. E.g., 1983 ADMIN. OFFICE
ANN. REP. tbl. V-2. Perhaps in response to the burgeoning numbers of designated
judges, the Annual Reports in 1984 and thereafter compile numbers of judges and
appeals in which they participated, thus making it more accessible to researchers.
E.g., 1992 ADMIN. OFFICE ANN. REP. tbl. V-2.
55. We can make this inference because almost all appellate terminations on the
merits are by three-judge panels, see infra text accompanying notes 74-75; furthermore, almost all panels with a designated judge contain only one district judge, see
infra text accompanying notes 133-35.
There is another source of data on the use of district judges on the courts of
appeals. The Annual Report supplies information on case participations by "visiting
judges" each year. See, e.g., 1990-1992 ADMIN. OFFICE ANN. REP., supra note 54, at tbl.
S-2. In 1992, visiting judges took part in 7 .2% of all case participations, 1992 ADMIN.
OFFICE ANN. REP., supra note 54, tbl. S-2, and prior years yield a similar percentage,
see, e.g., 1990 ADMIN. OFFICE ANN. REP., supra note 54, at tbl. S-2 (6.9% of all case
participations). For two reasons, we feel the data that we supply in Tables
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The circuits, however, vary considerably in their use of district
judges. Table 2, on the following page, supplies a snapshot of the
circuits for 1992. There we find that the use of district judges
ranges from zero in the D.C. Circuit to over thirty-five percent
in the Sixth Circuit. Other circuits with relatively high use of
district judges are the Fourth (twenty-nine percent) and Tenth
(thirty-one percent) Circuits. Not coincidentally, the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have comparatively high caseloads. Nonetheless,
the circuits with the highest caseloads-the Fifth and the
Ninth-report less dramatic use of district judges.

B. The Appellate Behavior of District Court Judges
The amount of district judge participation in appellate decision-making raises significant policy problems, which we explore
at greater length in the next section. Of equal significance is the
quality of that participation: how do district judges act while
they serve temporarily on a higher court? A comparison ofvoting
behavior of district judges and voting behavior of their circuit
colleagues would begin to answer that question.
To date, the only empirical study on this issue was conducted
by political scientists Justin J. Green and Burton M. Atkins. 56
Their database consisted of all published opinions from 1965 to
1969 in the federal courts of appeals. 57 The study found that
district judges participated in a broad spectrum of cases rather
than being concentrated in particular subject areas. 58 There was
little difference between appellate and district court judges with
regard to voting behavior: the study found that panels with

1 and 2 give a better picture of the use of district judges. First, we understand
"visiting judges, Das used in the Annual Report, to mean any judge not appointed to
serve on that circuit, which would include appellate judges from other circuits as well
as all district judges. Second, we understand "all case participationsD to include all
merits and non-merits terminations. For a discussion of "visiting judge" data, see
MCKENNA, supra note 3, at 38-39.
56. Green & Atkins, supra note 52.
57. Id. at 363. This amounted to 19,183 cases, excluding en bane cases, which,
by definition, do not include district judges. Id. at 370.
58. Id. at 365.
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district court judges had only a slightly lower reversal rate
(23.7%) than the average reversal rate of all appellate panels
(25.1%). 59 Likewise, Green and Atkins found that district judges
wrote about one-third of the opinions in cases where the decision
was unanimous, about the same as one would expect if the
opinions were distributed randomly to the members of a threejudge panel. 60 On the other hand, district judges wrote fewer
concurring or dissenting opinions than did circuit judges.61
Nonetheless, the authors concluded that, overall, district judges
were treated like and voted like permanent appellate judges.62
The Green and Atkins study is rightly regarded as the leading
empirical source on the quality of decision-making by designated
judges.63 The study is now subject to several caveats, however,
that limit its effectiveness as a modern resource upon which to
measure designated judging. Their database, almost a decade
old when they published their study, is now almost thirty years
old. Moreover, because it was based only on published opinions,64
the results may not apply to voting behavior in all cases.
For these reasons, access to more recent and complete data
would supplement the Green and Atkins study and enhance the
accuracy of conclusions drawn from it. We were able to access
such a database, extracted from a larger computer database on
the federal trial and appellate courts compiled by the Federal
Judicial Center (FJC). 65 This database included information
about all appeals terminated in the federal courts of appeals
between 1987 and 199266 by panels with designated judges,
including information about case outcomes and the presence of
dissents or concurrences.
·

59. Id. at 366.
60. Id. at 367.
61. Id. at 368-69.
62. Id. at 370 ("the effect [on the court of appeals' quality of production] is minimal").
63. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 52, at 101 (drawing favorable conclusions on use
of district judges based in part on the Green and Atkins study).
64. See supra text accompanying note 53.
65.
Our database is based in part on the Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data
Base, which is derived from reports filled out for each appellate termination and
submitted by the courts to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO).
The information supplied to the AO is compiled by the FJC and made available to
researchers through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Science
Research. See facsimile document .from Judith A. McKenna, Research Division,
Federal Judicial Center, to Michael E. Solimine 1 (Feb. 8, 1994) [hereinafter FJC
Data] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
66. Id.
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Several pieces of information from the FJC data are ofinterest
when compared to the Green and Atkins study. First, as summarized below in Table 3, the F JC data indicated an overall
reversal rate of 17.92% of merits terminations,67 compared with
a reversal rate of 18.30% for panels including at least one
district judge. 68 Unlike Green and Atkins, the FJC data also
separate appeals from district courts from other appeals, such
as those from federal administrative agencies. The reversal rate
with respect to the latter is almost identical, regardless of the
composition of the panel.
TABLES
FJC DATA ON VOTING BEHAVIOR OF APPELLATE PANELS
ON WmcH DISTRICT JUDGES SAT BY DESIGNATION

REvERsAL RATE
OVERALL

REvERsAL RATE
FROM DISTRICT COURT

ALL PANELS

17.92%

18.57%

PANEIS WITH AT
LEAST ONE DJ

18.30%

18.54%

Source: FJC Data, supra note 65, at 1,3. Note that "reversals"
include cases in which the outcome was recorded as "reversedvacated" or "affirmed in part and reversed in part" or "remanded."

Also of interest were data on the voting behavior of district
judges. Of cases in which a signed or separate opinion was

67. Id.
68. Id. at 3. These data are not analyzed for statistical significance because such
analysis is inappropriate when the data set contains the entire universe of cases being
investigated. See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 238-39 (2d ed. 1972). A
significance test between sub-populations would not rule out alternative explanations.
Id. at 239. Because Green and Atkins only looked at published opinions-which have
a higher reversal rate-it is not surprising that the FJC reversal rates are lower than
the rate found by Green & Atkins, supra note 52, at 366 (finding a reversal rate of
23.7% for appellate panels with one district judge). See Jon 0. Newman, A Study of
Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 632 (1992); see also Theodore Eisenberg
& Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 501, 517, 535 (1989) (discussing some of the reasons why published
opinions have a higher reversal rate).
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issued, about eighteen percent were prepared by the visiting district judge on the panel. 69 This is greater than the comparable
figure found by Green and Atkins. 70 Like the Green and Atkins
study, however, the FJC data showed low rates (one or two
percent) of dissenting or concurring opinions by districtjudges. 71
In contrast, circuit judges dissented or concurred in over three
percent of the cases. 72

III.

AsSESSING THE USE OF DISTRICT JUDGES SI'ITING BY
DESIGNATION ON APPEAL: ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

As the foregoing discussion suggests, under present circumstances a litigant who appeals a case from a federal district
court or a federal agency to a federal circuit court of appeals can
have no assurance that the case will be reviewed or decided by
a panel consisting exclusively of judges who were nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate for the position of
appellate judge. Indeed, although the practice has not yet
become common, the litigant may find that the panel assigned
to decide her case may consist of a majority of judges who have
69.
Derived from FJC Data, supra note 65, at 4.
70. See Green and Atkins, supra note 52, at 367 (finding that district judges
issued signed or separate opinions in roughly 12% of the sample).
71.
District judges authored dissents in 1.6% of dispositions by panels containing
a visiting judge, and authored concurring opinions in 2.0% of panel dispositions. FJC
Data, supra note 65, at 4. For largely similar results obtained from a survey of the
Ninth Circuit, see Stephen L. Washy, Of Judges, Hobgoblins, and Small Minds:
Dimensions ofDisagreement in the Ninth Circuit, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS:
BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE COURTS 154, 159 (Sheldon Goldman &
Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986).
72. See facsimile document from Judith A. McKenna, Research Division, Federal
Judicial Center, to Michael E. Solimine (May 12, 1994) (on file with the Uniuersity
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Unfortunately, the Green and Atkins study is
not clear on the overall dissent or concurrence rate of district judges, or that of circuit
judges alone. See Green & Atkins, supra note 52, at 36~9 (providing data showing
the distribution of percentages of the total number of dissenting and concurring opinions written by various types of judges). Other works reveal results similar to the
figure derived from the FJC database. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF
APl'EAU; IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 8YsrEM: A SrunY OF THE SEooND, FIFm, AND Dls'micT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 42, 193-96 (1981) (discussing dissent rates); Burton M. Atkins &
Justin J. Green, Consensus on: the United States Courts of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 735, 742 (1976) (finding that dissenting votes were cast in
6.2% of all courts of appeals decisions); Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of
Appeals, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRmCAL AsSESSMENT 35, 42 (John B. Gates &
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (finding only a 3.6% rate of non-unanimous decisions
in 1986).
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not been nominated or confirmed for that position. As a practical
matter, should this fact make any difference to the parties?
The data presented in the previous Part suggest that, at least
when measured against a standard that looks at the actual
outcomes of cases, the performance of circuit courts does not
differ markedly on the basis of whether or not a district judge
has participated on a particular panel. But this does not necessarily suggest that the participation of a district judge is a
neutral phenomenon, either with respect to the decision-making
dynamics-the quality and character of deliberation-of appellate panels or with respect to the overall administration of the
circuit courts. Indeed, as we suggest in this Part, the participation of districtjudges raises a number of interesting and largely
unexplored questions.
In this Part, we consider the implications of district judges
sitting by designation from the perspectives of the parties who
litigate in the federal courts of appeals and those concerned with
the efficient and effective operation of the federal judicial system.
Later we will consider the implications of current practice for
those who ultimately are responsible. for the staffing of the
federal judicial system: the President and the Senate.

A Consistency in Judgment
Ideally, all decisions handed down by a multi-member court
should be consistent. That is, such decisions should follow and
conform to each other, to the extent that it is possible in any
body of legal doctrine. 73 Perhaps toward this end, the federal
courts of appeals render the vast majority of their decisions in
three-judge panels. The en bane procedure,74 although rarely
used, is also intended to promote uniformity among decisions
within a circuit. 75

73.
For a discussion of various structures, mechanisms, and procedures of appellate review and their effect on doctrinal harmony and collegiality, see Daniel J.
Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REV. 255,
281-92 (1975).
74.
For a description of the en bane procedure, see 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988); FED.
R. APP. P. 35.
75. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see also Michael A. Stein, Uniformity in the Federal
Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Reuiew, 54 U. PITT. L.
REV. 805, 819-23 (1993) (evaluating the benefits of en bane review with regard to
uniformity).

372

Unive1'Sity of Michigan JoumaJ, of Law 'Reform

[VOL. 28:2

There are, however, a number of factors that can conspire to
undermine this ideal. Panels whose membership periodically
rotate can lead to doctrinal inconsistency. 76 Judges of a geographically far-flung circuit may only meet for several weeks out
of a year, disrupting the sort of close consultation and collegiality
that may underlie better-written and more consistent decisions. 77
The temporary use of judicial personnel who do not work fulltime on the circuit is another potentially disruptive force. This,
of course, is the problem posed by district judges sitting by
designation on the courts of appeals.
Several empirical studies suggest that the latter concern should
not be taken lightly. In one such study, political scientist Stephen
Washy interviewed judges on the Ninth Circuit,78 which utilizes
the greatest number of districtjudges. 79 He found that, although

76. Cf Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE
L.J. 82, 102-15 (1986) (arguing that consistency and coherence are not necessarily
impaired in panel decision-making).
In its discussion of concerns related to circuit size and workload, the March 1995
report of the United States Judicial Conference's Committee on Long Range Planning
defines a court as a "cohesive group of individuals who are familiar with one another's
ways of thinking, reacting, persuading, and being persuaded." PROPOSED LoNG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 16, at 42. As such, the report warns that an appellate court should
not consist of "a large group of strangers-like a jury venire-who are essentially
unknown to one another." Id. In addressing issues related to expanding the size of
the circuit courts as a way to keep up with burgeoning caseload growth, the report
cautions against steps that might be inconsistent with the notion of an appellate court
as "an incorporeal body of precedent and tradition, of shared experiences and collegial
feelings, whose members possess a common devotion to mastering circuit law, maintaining its coherence and consistency (thus assuring its predictability), and adjudicating cases in like manner." Id. Although the report does not explicitly relate these
concerns to the use of designated district judges in the circuit courts, they would seem
to be relevant in that context.
77.
Of course, geographic proximity does not guarantee collegiality. Consider the
"acerbic battles" between Warren Burger and David Bazelon while both were on the
D.C. Circuit in the 1960s. HOWARD, supra note 72, at 204, 206 n.i. Likewise, distance
alone does not necessarily lead to poor communication. See generally Stephen L.
Washy, Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern for Collegiality, 11 U. PuGET
SOUND L. REV. 73 (1987) (examining how judges on the Ninth Circuit communicate
with each other). We acknowledge that many of the concerns we advance in this section
of the Article with respect to district judges also apply to circuit judges visiting from
another circuit. However, the concerns with respect to independence of judgment,
which will be discussed in the next section, presumably are fewer with respect to a
visiting appellate judge from a court of equal stature than with a visiting trial judge.
78. Wasby, supra note 46, at 370 n.2; see also Stephen L. Washy, Inconsistency
in the United States Courts of Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms for Resolution,
32 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1979) (expanding interviews and study to the Eighth
Circuit). ·
79. See tbl. 2, supra p. 367. This may be due, in part, to the fact that the Ninth
Circuit is the largest circuit. See Wasby, supra note 77, at 77 (identifying the Ninth
Circuit as the largest geographically and in number of judges as of 1987).
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the use of extra judges in the Ninth Circuit was necessary to
meet the circuit's caseload,80 several Ninth Circuit judges felt that
the use of district judges led to intracircuit inconsistency in
doctrine and difficulties in communication. 81
It is difficult to verify statistically the existence or extent of
these phenomena. Washy concluded that problems did exist82 but
that perhaps they were not serious. 83 Other evidence, howev~r,
suggests that the Ninth Circuit judges were accurate in their
perception ofintracircuit conflict. Arthur Hellman has documented the doctrinal inconsistencies within the Ninth Circuit, 84
though he has not laid blame at the feet of designated district
judges. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the
large numbers of district judges used in the Ninth Circuit has
played a part in lack of uniformity.
In this regard, we note that Justin Green compiled evidence
that, at least indirectly, supports such a supposition. 85 Green
found 297 decisions wherein the designated judge86 wrote the
majority opinion on a panel and a circuit judge dissented. 87
Green then traced the subsequent treatment of these decisions
in Shepards Federal Citations and compared his findings to a
similar analysis of a random sample of unanimous decisions by
panels made up of circuit judges. 88 Green found that the 297
80. Washy, supra note 46, at 373-74.
81. Id. at 374; cf. Washy, supra note 78, at 1362 (finding that judges felt that the
large number of judges participating in the court's work did magnify the problem of
inconsistency-and certainly the 'extra' "judges increased the number of participants").
82. See Washy, supra note 46, at 373-76.
83. See Washy, supra note 78, at 1362 (deriving his conclusions from the Ninth
Circuit judges' comments).
84. See Arthur D. H!'lllman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the
Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and
Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice ofPrecedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989).
85. See Justin J. Green, The Influence on Circuit Law of Judges Sitting "By
Designation" 5-6 (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Sept. 2, 1979) (unpublished manuscript, on tile with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
86. Green defines "designated judge" as either a senior-or retired-judge, a
visiting circuit judge, or a district court judge. Id. at 1. See also Green & Atkins, supra
note 52, at 359-60 n.4 (defining "designated judges" in a similar way).
87. Green, supra note 85, at 5.
88. Id. It would seem that the more appropriate comparison would be to nonunanimous decisions of panels made up of three circuit judges. The comparison made
by Green could only tell us that any differences observed regarding cases taken en
bane or granted certiorari might be premised on the existence of disagreement on the
panel, not on the presence of a district judge. Both factors, of course, might explain
the differences Green found, but that is difficult to conclude given the comparison he
made. Green did not address this point in his paper.
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cases had higher rates of en bane review, higher rates of certiorari being sought, and higher rates of certiorari being granted
in cases where the designated judge cast the deciding vote. 89
Likewise, Green found some evidence that the 297 cases had
more negative citations than the other group, though the
differences were not robust. 90 Thus, to the extent that lack of
consistency in the circuit is problematic, district judge participation on panels may contribute to the problem.
It has been suggested that district judge participation may also
lead to more en bane review. 91 This might be expected for two
reasons. First, the regular judges of a circuit might be more
willing to grant en bane review in cases where district judges
sit by designation, especially in non-unanimous decisions where
a visiting district judge's vote is necessary for a court majority
and a circuit judge has dissented. In the eyes of some circuit
judges, the fact that the district judge's vote was necessary for
the judgment might diminish the status of the decision and thus
make it more appropriate for review by the full court. The
inclination of the full court to grant en bane review might be
even greater in cases where two district judges sat on the
original panel. The notion of two district judges establishing the
law of the circuit-especially in cases involving controversial or
high-profile issues-might be unsettling to some judges of the
circuit.
Second, district judges, perhaps less familiar with appellate
practice, may help formulate decisions that are inconsistent with
circuit precedent. Green's data supports this charge,92 as does
more recent data collected by one of the present authors, whose
study considered 224 en bane decisions published in 1985, 1986,
and 1987.93 Professor Solimine, author of the study, reexamined
the 224 cases94 giving rise to en bane review; his reanalysis
89. Id. at 5-6 (certiorari sought in 31 % of the 297 cases, as compared to 22% of
all circuit judge decisions; certiorari granted in 14% of former cases (13 of 93) as
compared to 2% in latter; en bane review of eight of the 297 cases, as compared to one
in the latter).
90. Id. at 6-11 (finding that the mean numbers of negative citations within the
circuit for the 297 cases and for the sample of all circuit-judge decisions was .17 and
.07, respectively). Green, however, characterized the numbers as "too small" to
conclude that "the use of designated judges [has] an untoward disruptive effect on the
making of circuit law." Id. at 9.
91. HOWARD, supra note 72, at 190; Green & Atkins, supra note 52, at 361.
92.
Green, supra note 85, at 7-9.
93. See Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29,
61 (1988).
94. In only 160 of the 224 cases could the membership of the initial three-judge
panel be determined. Id. at 35 n.27.
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indicated that about twenty-nine percent were the product of
panel decisions in which a district judge participated,95 which
is higher than the rate of such participation in panels as a
whole. 96
We find the sum of this evidence to. be equivocal on the
existence and amount ofintracircuit inconsistency. Perhaps the
problem itself has been exaggerated,97 but, given the mounting
pressures for the appointment of more federal judges and the
increasing number of written decisions, it is difficult to believe
that any inconsistency that does exist will soon go away. 98
District judges have played a role, though perhaps a small one,
in contributing to such inconsistency.

B. Independence of Judgment
Conventional wisdom holds that multi-member appellate courts
must operate in an atmosphere of collegiality in order to perform
properly. 99 Only in such an atmosphere can appellate judges and
95. Support for this reanalysis and the newly examined cases is on file with the
authors.
96. For the rate of district judge participation on panels as a whole, see tbl. 1,
supra p. 365. It is also worth noting that the Solimine study examined 58 cases during
the time period in question where en bane review was sought and denied but where
at least one circuit judge issued a published decision dissenting from the denial.
Solimine, supra note 93, at 65 tbl. 5. Thirteen of those (22%) involved panels including
a district judge. Support. for this figure is on file with the authors.
Several factors might ameliorate the potential for district judge contribution to
intracircuit inconsistency. Most if not all districtjudges have access to computerized
case law databases, which can make it easier to keep up with the law of the circuit.
Likewise, district judges who sit repeatedly on the circuit might eventually develop
some of the broader perspective of circuit law which circuit judges will normally
possess. See infra Part IV.C. Finally, inconsistency from whatever source can be
reduced by emphasizing the practice of circulating drafts of opinions, prior to release,
to all members of the circuit. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES§ 14.3 (1985)(providingthat "[a]lljudges
receive copies of any proposed opinions"); see also Solimine, supra note 93, at 36 n.38.
97. See MCKENNA, supra hote 3, at 2 n.4, 93 (reporting the results of a survey of
80% of all circuit and district judges and finding that most judges who responded
indicated that intracircuit inconsistency was a small problem or none at all).
98. We note that the Federal Judicial Conference's recent proposed long range
plan for the federal courts, in a section entitled "Restructuring Appellate Review,"
acknowledges that proposals to deal with the caseload crisis that focus on adding more
circuit judges or expanding the role of"adjunctjudicial officers" may "lead to inconsistency and incoherence in circuit law." PROPOSED LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 16, at
123.
99. See Meador, supra note 73, at 281; Collins J. Seitz, Collegiality and the Court
of Appeals, 75 JUDICATURE 26, 26 (1991).
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their clerks communicate with each other effectively and render
· reasonably correct judgments in written decisions. As the Federal
Judicial Conference's noted in its recent proposed long-range plan
for the federal courts:
The effectiveness, credibility, and efficiency of a court of
appeals is intricately linked to its ability to function as a
unified body. A judge's sense that he or she speaks for the
whole court and not merely as an individual is critical to an
appellate court's ability to shape and maintain a coherent
body oflaw, and it contributes to the satisfaction of appellate
judges. 100
Simply put, collegiality on an appellate court increases job
satisfaction and improves communication, without undermining
respect for the differing views that may be embodied in concurring or dissenting opinions. One predicate for collegiality, it
would seem, is the presence of judges who are on relatively equal
social and professional footing and who interact regularly and
for relatively long periods of time. 101
This comfortable model is subject to disruption by the use of
district judges sitting by designation. District judges who serve
for only short periods may view themselves and may be viewed
as subordinate to their appellate counterparts. It may be difficult
to set aside, even temporarily, the necessarily hierarchical nature
of the relationship between the permanent and temporary
judge. 102 If so, the district judge may be deferential to his circuit
counterparts and reluctant to vote differently in the form of concurring or dissenting opinions. 103 Perhaps mindful that his own
decisions are reviewed periodically, the district judge may be
hesitant to depart from the vote of the two permanent circuit
panel members. Such strategic voting behavior by the district
judge may undermine the independent thought that seems to
100. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 16, at 42. The plan associates the
potential decline in collegiality with the growth of the courts of appeals, noting that
"as a court grows it may become more difficult for its judges to become familiar with
their colleagues' views." Id. The plan notes that this may be a "particular problem
when new judges are added to courts in large groups." Id.
101. Cf. Meador, supra note 73, at 284 (noting that the members' fixed panels may
reach decisions more readily because each becomes familiar with the others' ideas).
102. See Newman, supra note 68, at 629 (noting that an appellate judge's jurisdiction
to reverse the decision of a district judge creates an "undeniable basis for some tension"
between them).
103. See Green & Atkins, supra note 52, at 368-69 (finding "strong pressures against
[issuing] a solitary opinion").
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underlie true collegiality and the sort of decision-making contemplated by Article III. 104 Alternatively, the problem may be one
of vertical deference. District judges may be reluctant to overrule
a fellow district judge, even when the law and facts seem to call
for that result. 105 This may be, in part, because district judges
are used to making decisions on their own and may be.uncomfortable with group decision-making. 106
On the positive side, temporary judges from a lower court may
improve appellate decision-making. District judges may lend a
different and beneficial perspective to the panel, especially if the
judgment under review is from a district court. For instance, the
district judge might be able to educate the circuit judge on the
realities of trial court decision-making, thereby informing the
review of such decisions. 107 On the other hand, as discussed in
the previous section, this different perspective may detract from
intracircuit consistency. 108
In addition to these possible effects within the court system,
there also may be external effects. Participation by district judges
might make the panel decision carry less authority in the eyes
oflitigants, their attorneys, and affected members of the public. 109
Disappointed litigants may tend to press more often for en bane
or Supreme Court review if the original panel consisted of a
designated district judge. 110

104. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 51-56 (1993) (discussing strategic
behavior by judges in a collegial setting). Such strategic behavior might be expected
less from senior district judges sitting by designation. Presumably because of their
lighter caseload, senior judges render fewer trial decisions, or perhaps none, subject
to appeal, ameliorating the problem suggested here. As Tables 1 and 2, supra pp. 365,
367, indicate, senior district judges have recently constituted about a third of all district
judges sitting by designation. The FJC Data, supra note 65, that we used do not distinguish between active and senior judges, so we have not been able to examine the
implications of this difference in status.
105. Wasby, supra note 46, at 379.
106. See HOWARD, supra note 72, at 135 n.d (commenting on the "autocratic position"
of the trial judge in the decision-making process).
107. See Wasby, supra note 46, at 378-79; cf Harrison L. Winter, Goodwill and
Dedication, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 167, 168-69
(Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judicial Center, eds., 1989) (recounting a circuit judge's frustration, shared with a district judge, with the limited scope
of review on appeal).
108. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
109. See Wasby, supra note 46, at 374-75.
110. See Green & Atkins, supra note 52, at 361 (finding some evidence that en bane
decisions are more likely to overrule a panel decision if the panel included a district
judge (citing A. Lamar Alexander, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Court ofAppeals:
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 583, 586 (1965))). In
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Empirical evidence can be brought to bear on some of these
issues. Taking the extrajudicial effects first, we observed in the
previous section that, at least to some degree, district judge
participation weakens the authoritative status of panel decisions.111 Such decisions are more likely to be the subject of en
bane review and of Supreme Court certiorari petitions. 112 Likewise, there is some evidence to support the fear that district
judges may not act as full-fledged members of the appellate court.
Although previously we observed that district judges appear to
vote to reverse their fellow district judges at about the same rate
as do circuit judges, 113 district judges write dissenting or concurring opinions less often than do circuit judges and appear to write
the panel opinion less often as well. 114 This latter conclusion
suggests that, on the whole, district judges are deferring more
to their circuit counterparts than appellate judges defer to each
other.
This conclusion is supported by two articles written by political
scientist Thomas Walker. In one, Walker examined 370 opinions
issued by the Washington Supreme Court in 1965 and 1966 in
which a lower court judge had participated. 115 Based in part on
low dissent rates by, and more opinion assignments to, the
temporary judges, Walker concluded that the permanent members of the court viewed the temporary designatees primarily as
vehicles for workload reduction. 116 Relatedly, the temporary
judges seemed to behave in a compliant manner toward the
permanent judges. 117

addition, the consumers-other judges and litigants-of panel opinions authored by
district judges, viewing such decisions as less authoritative, might be less likely to
rely on such opinions in assessing the state of the law. This assumption would
presumably lead to less inconsistency and confusion. The assumption could be subject
to empirical investigation, but it is beyond the scope of this Article.
111. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
113. See tbl. 3, supra p. 369. We make this statement with some equivocation, since
the FJC Data, supra note 65, does not directly measure the voting behavior of
individual district judges. Because the same database tells us that district judges
dissent relatively rarely, however, we can reasonably infer their voting behavior by
knowing how the panels on which they sit decide.
114. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. It is common practice for judges
to decide who will write the opinion after oral argument or after submission of the
case on the briefs. See Robert J. Martineau, Cra~ and Technique, Not Canons and
Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View ofStatutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1, 24-26 (1993).
115. Thomas G. Walker, Behavior of Temporary Members in Small Groups, 58 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 144, 145 (1973).
116. Id. at 145-46.
117. Id. at 146.
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In the second study, Walker examined interaction between
district and circuit judges in the now repealed three-judge district
courts. 118 Typically, these three-judge courts consisted ofa circuit
judge, a district judge, and the district judge before whom the
case was originally filed. 119 Walker studied fifty-six published
opinions issued by such courts between 1963 and 1968. 120 His
study revealed that the circuit judge issued the majority of
written opinions121 and that the district judges usually voted with
the circuit judge. 122 Walker concluded that the "appeals court
judge appears to be the most influential member of such
courts."123
Temporary members of small groups, or junior members of
temporary groups, typically have less influence in the group than
permanent members. 124 The difference is exacerbated if the
temporary members have a lower status or possess less expertise
than the permanent members. 125 The use of district judges on
the courts of appeals fits neatly into this model. 126 District judges
are perceived by some to have lower status or prestige than
circuit judges 127 and typically will have less acumen regarding
appellate practice. These factors suggest that district judges
sitting by designation will have less influence and less independence of judgment. 128

118. Thomas G. Walker, Behavioral Tendencies in the Three-Judge District Court,
17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 407 (1973). Three-judge district courts were originally authorized
by the Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 266, 36 Stat. 1162 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)), which was repealed by the Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-381, 90 Stat. 1119. Three-judge district courts still exist for some cases under certain
federal laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1988). For a discussion of these provisions, see BATOR
ET AL., supra note 30, at 1333-37.
119. Walker, supra note 118, at 407 n.4.
120. Id. at 411.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 412-13.
123. Id. at 413.
124. Walker, supra note 115, at 144-45; see also Richard L. Moreland & John M.

Levine, Socialization in Small Groups: Temporal Changes in Individual-Group
Relations, in 15 ADVANCES. IN ExPERIMENTAL SocIAL PsYCHOLOGY 137 (Leonard Berkowitz
ed., 1982) (describing the dynamics of small-group socialization).
125. See Walker, supra note 118, at 408-09.
126.

Cf. RoBERr A

CARP & RoNAID SrmHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 171-96 (2d ed. 1991)

(applying small group analysis to multi-judge decision-making).
127. Cf. HOWARD, supra note 72, at 113 (referring to the "promotion" of district judges
to the circuit level).
128. In 1983, one of the present authors, Richard B. Saphire, and his then-colleague,
Professor Pamela J. Stephens (currently of Vermont Law School), sought to explore
some of these questions through a survey offederal district judges. Richard B. Saphire,
Study of the Practice of Assigning Federal District Court Judges to Sit by Designation
on .Court of Appeals (undated study) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
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Some of the interplay between circuit and district judges can
be illustrated by a glance at the appellate opinions themselves.
For example, one sometimes finds deferential language in a
district judge's dissent, perhaps more so than the ritual language
of collegiality one finds in circuit judge dissents. 129 One district
judge, dissenting from a Sixth Circuit panel decision, spoke of
the "temerity required of a district judge in dissenting from the
opinion of an appellate panel on which he sits by designation. "130
On the more positive side, one also finds majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions in which district judges seem to take
pains to describe and discuss trial issues with which they may
have more familiarity. 131
of Law Reform). Some 309 of 329 district judges responded. Id. at 1. Of these
respondents, 219 (71 %) had served at least once by designation, id., and 98 (32%) had
declined invitations to serve by designation, id. at 2, usually due to their own workload,
id. The vast majority who had served by designation (over 90%) stated that they had
not felt inhibited at all in discussing the case with their appellate counterparts or in
dissenting. Id. at 3. These results suggest that district judges do have an independence
of judgment on the courts of appeals. The results should be tempered, however, by
the knowledge· that respondents in self-reported surveys like this one may consciously
answer in ways that make them look good, or in ways that they think the researchers
desire. &e RoBERT RosENTllAL & RALPH L. RosNow, ~OF BEHAVIORAL REsEAR.cH:
METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS 135 (1984)(noting th~t, when responses on a questionnaire
correlate to the socially desirable responses, it is usually interpreted to mean that the
respondents were motivated to present themselves in a favorable light).
129. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 372 (7th Cir. 1993) (Shadur,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority opinion in this case has done violence (not purposefully,
of course) to one or more of the most fundamental principles of federal jurisdiction.");
United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1505 (7th Cir. 1993) (Shadur, J., concurring)
("I am constrained to express my respectful disagreement with one aspect of the opinion
....");United States v. Roberts, 986 F.2d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir.) (Potter, J., dissenting)
("It is not an easy task to dissent from an opinion by the respected majority .... "),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. ~71 (1993).
130. Anderson v. Evans, 660 F.2d 153, 161 (6th Cir. 1981) (Rice, J., dissenting).
Judge Rice went on to "set forth [his] reasons for disagreement, below, as briefly as
possible." Id.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 396 (3d Cir. 1993) (Pollak,
J., dissenting) (arguing for a remand to allow the district court to amplify its findings),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994); Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 340
(7th Cir. 1993) (Crabb, J., concurring) (explaining the use and application of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)); Dickerson v. Department of Justice, 992 F.2d 1426, 1434
(6th Cir. 1993) (Beckwith, J., concurring) (suggesting stronger grounds for the result
reached by the district court and affirmed in the instant case), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1049 (1994); Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404-07 (6th Cir.
1992) (majority opinion by Cleland, J., giving a careful explanation of how a district
court must examine an unopposed summary judgment motion); Wheeler v. McKinley
Enters., 937 F.2d 1158, 1167 (6th Cir. 1991) (Joiner, J., concurring) (explaining the
proper use of jury interrogatories by a district judge); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,
886 F.2d 1472, 1476-81 (6th Cir. 1989) (majority opinion by Bertelsman, J., offering
a scholarly review of the shift in the Supreme Court's views on summary judgment);
Sakamoto v. N.A.B. Trucking Co., 717 F.2d 1000, 1004-07 (6th Cir. 1983) (majority
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In the end we are faced with mixed evidence regarding the
independence of judgment by district judges on the courts of
appeals. Like the issue of consistency of decisions, perhaps the
asserted lack of independence is exaggerated. After all, district
judges possess lifetime tenure under Article III of the Constitution and enjoy significant prestige of their own. 132 Given their
status, they may be unlikely candidates to defer to anyone,
including their circuit court colleagues. Moreover, even if one
concludes that the district judge does not perfectly replicate the
ideal circuit judge, this judge constitutes only one-third of a
panel. Two-thirds are still made up of "real" appellate judges.
The problematic aspects of district judge participation on
appellate panels are exacerbated when district judges make up

opinion by Bertelsman, J., giving a careful analysis of the interplay between rules 49
and 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
132. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § l; Michael Wells, Against an Elite Federal Judiciary:
Comments on the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
923, 937-38 (discussing tenure as a factor making positions on the federal district court
bench desirable).
Somewhat analogous questions ofindependence have arisen in examinations of the
utilization of United States Magistrate Judges in the district courts. For example, it
has been suggested that Article III-judge control over magistrates, in the form of
reappointment power and power to determine the nature and scope of authority, makes
magistrates "beholdenn to federal judges in a way that compromises the independence
that is the hallmark of the federal judiciary. Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1037, 1053 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting). See generally Reinier H.
Kraakman, Note, Article Ill Constraints and the Expanding Ciuil Jurisdiction ofFederal
·Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1055-57 (1979) (discussing the "role
problems arising from the magistrate's dual position as judicial subordinate and
independent adjudicato~). Of course, district judges sitting in their own courts are
also subject to constant review by circuit judges in the normal course of appeals, and
this sort of "controln has not been thought to threaten their independence in the
constitutional sense. AB Judge Richard A. Posner has noted, "(a]ppellate judges ...
cannot fire district judges, cow them, or silence them-cannot prevent them from
making independent judgments and expressing independent views. n Geras, 742 F.2d
at 1053 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner's observation, of course, also holds true
when a district judge sits by designation on a circuit court: if a district judge alienates
or disappoints a circuit judge colleague during service on the court, the judge risks
little more than not being asked to serve again, though that risk might not be insignificant for at least some district judges. But it is also true that a district judge, recognizing that his circuit co-panelists will be reviewing his decisions· for years to come, might
be less inclined to challenge his co-panelists' judgement than would a regular circuit
judge.
It is important to note that we have no direct evidence that district judges have
felt cowed or otherwise intimidated or constrained during circuit court service. Indeed,
our conversations and correspondence with district and circuit judges have never
suggested that they possess any lack of confidence in, or commitment to, their ability
to be fully independent actors while sitting on the circuit courts. Our suggestion is
only that the possibility for the existence of independence-compromising constraints
is greater for district judges than it is for circuit judges in the appellate context.
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two of the three-judge panel. Although the presence of such
panels until now has been rare, 133 they seem to occur with some
frequency on the Fourth Circuit. 134 Were this practice to become
more widespread, it would raise serious policy questions, similar
to those already suggested above, with regard to the now defunct
three-judge district courts. The inevitable next step would be the
regular use of three district judges to compose panels, a prospect
already under discussion. 135 While such panels would do away

133. See FJC Data, supra note 65, at 2 (reporting that, of 30,482 cases with one
or more visiting judges, 188 had panels with two judges sitting by designation).
Apparently, no one has questioned whether the use of such panels violates 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(b) (1988). See supra note 42.
134. E.g., Rickelts v. Vann, 32 F.3d 71 (4th Cir. 1994); Randall v. United States,
30 F.3d 518 (4th Cir.1994); Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family Crisis Ctr., 7 F.3d
40 (4th Cir. 1993); Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d
500 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993); In re Members Warehouse, Inc., 991
F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1993); Media Gen. Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium
Council of Co-Owners, 991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993); Trans Fleet Enters., Inc. v. Boone,
987 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir. 1992); Shofer v. Hack Co., 970 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1992);
Carlton v. Firstcorp, Inc., 967 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1992); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Stark, 962
F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1992); Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1992); Guinness PLC
v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1992); Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223 (4th Cir.
1992); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1951 (1992); Colvin v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1991); NLRB v. Southern
Maryland Hosp. Ctr., 916 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Beyer v. C.I.R., 916
F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1990).
We make no claim that these cases are a scientific sample of all Fourth Circuit panel
decisions with two district judges; we merely surveyed published opinions. Even so,
it is interesting to note that of these 15 cases, 13 involved appeals from district courts,
and six of those reversed, in whole or in part, or vacated the district court decision.
This reversal rate is higher than usual. See tbl. 3, supra p. 369. Moreover, in no case
did the circuit judge dissent, and in only one did a district judge write an additional
opinion. All this may suggest that even when district judges make up a majority of
a panel, they still may d·efer to circuit judges.
135. See MCKENNA, supra note 3, at 136-39 (discussing the use of review panels
comprised of district judges who screen appeals from district courts).
A similar model is permitted in appeals from bankruptcy court decisions whereby
the circuit has the discretion to establish three-judge panels made up of bankruptcy
judges to decide appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l) (1988). The litigants can opt out of this
procedure and pursue an appeal to the usual panels of Article III judges. Id. § 158(a);
see also 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 3926.1 (Supp. 1995) (discussing the legislation
creating the current structure for bankruptcy appeals). Only the Ninth Circuit has
exercised the option to establish such panels. MCKENNA, supra note 3, at 7 n.18. A
somewhat dated study of those panels found that the panels reversed more often than
their district court counterparts-where an initial appeal would otherwise be taken-and that attorneys expressed little dissatisfaction with the arrangement. Gordon
Bermant & Judy B. Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience,
21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181, 201, 215 (1989). Recent legislation provides that each circuit will
establish a bankruptcy appeal panel made up of three bankruptcy judges unless the
circuit's judicial council finds that certain special circumstances exist. Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c)-(d), 108 Stat. 4106 (to be codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)).
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with any judgment. independence concerns, they would nevertheless heighten the concern about the lack of doctrinal consistency
and render problematic the notion of a separate tier of appellate
courts.
IV. AsSESSING THE USE OF DISTRICT JUDGES SITTING
BY DESIGNATION ON APPEAL: SELECTION OF JUDGES

We have suggested that the problems raised by the utilization
of district judges on appellate panels are not trivial. From the
perspective of parties who litigate in the federal courts of appeals,
the presence of district judges on appellate panels may lead to
a decision-making process in which the independence of judgment
supposedly ensured by Article Ill's salary and life tenure
protections is compromised. We also outlined a set of operational
and administrative issues associated with the current practice
of utilizing district judges on appellate panels.
We now turn to an iinportant conceptual problem that the
utilization of district judges in the courts of appeals presents,
a problem that assumes greater significance as the appellate
deployment of district judges becomes increasingly routine. In
particular, we consider whether the utilization of district judges
threatens to undermine the integrity and rationality of the
method by which these judges are selected.
Before we begin, we need to sketch at least the basic elements
of what we believe to be a rational selection process for federal
judges. Any such effort must, of course, account for the political
dimensions of such a process.
A. The Political Dimensions of the
Judicial Selection Process

Although the Constitution confers on the President the power
to appoint federal judges along with "all other Officers of the
United States" with "the Advice and Consent of the Senate,"136
it fails to offer guidelines for determining when or whether a
person proposed by the President or considered by the Senate

136. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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is eligible to serve as a federaljudge. 137 Although it has been said
that the goal of Article H's advice and consent provision "was
clearly to help secure meritorious appointees," 138 the precise
nature, contents, and role of merit considerations have been the
subject of much debate. 139 What has not been the subject of
debate, however, is that political considerations were expected
to be, and indeed have been, important factors in the process of
selecting federal judges. 140
·
Political considerations have played a role in nominations to
all levels of the federal judiciary. For example, there has been
a long tradition of taking political factors 141 into account in the
nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court justices. 142 As
Professor Freund has noted, the first century of the appointing
process saw "parochialism combined with partisanship to shape
appointments to the Court." 143 In his 1985 analysis of how
Supreme Court Justices are chosen, Professor Tribe traced the
failure of the nomination of John Rutledge in 1795 to inquiry by

137. The Constitution requires at least some minimum qualifications for the Senate,
the House of Representatives, and the Presidency. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3
(establishing age, citizenship, and residency requirements for Representatives and
Senators); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (establishing age, citizenship and residency requirements
for the President). It requires no analogous requirements for federal judges.
138. Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1202, 1205 (1988).
139. See infra Part Iv.B.
140. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, The Limits ofAduice and Consent, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
876, 876 (1990) ("[T]he judgments that the President and the Senate are supposed
to reach in the nomination and confirmation processes are essentially political judgments-in both the highest and lowest senses of that term.").
141. By "political factors," we mean a range of factors not necessarily related to
assessments of professional competence. These include: partisan considerations related
to political party membership and involvement; considerations related to obtaining
geographical or racial representation or balance on a particular court; presidential
deference to other political actors such as United States senators; and ideological
considerations related to a potential nominee's likely voting patterns and their relation
to issues or constituencies viewed as particularly important to a given President. As
Professor Freund has noted in discussing the "history of unsuccessful nominations"
to the Supreme Court, "although politics in the partisan sense has never ceased to
be a factor, it has been increasingly outweighed by politics in the larger, Aristotelian
sense-a perception that an individual's identity is conditioned by his or her associations, inclinations, and sympathies." Paul A Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some
Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1157 (1988); see also Monaghan, supra
note 138, at 1204 (describing the confirmation process as political because the president
"has selected an appointee satisfactory to him-a judgment that may include the
nominee's philosophy, as well as a wide range of factors not associated with merit in
a narrow sense, such as the appointee's contribution to the diversity of the Court").
142. See Monaghan, supra note 138, at 1207 (characterizing the appointment process
as involving "mainly questions of prudence, judgment, and politics").
143. Freund, supra note 141, at 1148.
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the Senate into his political views. 144 While modern attention to
the political implications and motivations for Supreme Court
nominations may have reached its peak in the 1987 struggle over
the nomination of Judge Robert Bork, 145 subsequent Supreme
Court vacancies have continued to be major political events. 146
Politics also plays an important role in the selection of judges
for the lower federal courts. In his influential study of the
federal judge appointment process, Harold Chase traced much
of the criticism of the process to its political nature. 147 While
observing that "our political leaders have been apologetic in
defending the consideration given to party affiliation," 148 Chase
also noted that "the importance of party in judicial selection is
writ large on the record provided by American history." 149 He
reviewed the appointments records of the Truman, Eisenhower,
and Kennedy administrations and found that the overwhelming
majority of appointments to the lower federal courts went to
individuals from each President's political party. 150 Analyses of
the Carter administration appointments to the federal bench reveal a similar connection between the political affiliation of nominees and the President who nominated them. 151 This pattern

144. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF
JUSTICES CAN CHANGE OUR LIVES 86 (1985).
145. See generolly ETHAN BRoNNER, BATI'LE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BoRK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (1989) (analyzing the strife surrounding the Bork nomination).
146. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, The Blackmun Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at
A27 (noting that President Bill Clinton was advised not to appoint Judge Richard
Arnold to fill Justice Harry A Blackmun's seat on the Supreme Court "because [Arnoldi
is from Arkansas and Arkansas is in bad odor right now").
147. HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 187 (1972).
148. Id. at 71. Chase quoted President John F. Kennedy as stating, in response
to an American Bar Association's proposal to divide judgeships between the political
parties," 'I would hope that the paramount consideration in the appointment of ajudge
would not be his political party but his qualifications .. .' (emphasis supplied)." Id.
149. Id. at 72; see also JOSEPH C. GoULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE
WORLD OF THE POWERFUL FEDERAL JUDGES 24 (1974) ("Lacking constitutional guidelines,
the appointive system has evolved through custom. And an essential element of our
custom is that political connections are as important to a prospective judge as is
his legal ability.").
150. CHASE, supra note 147, at 112.
151. Under the Carter administration, both district and circuit judge nominating
commissions were established. See ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NOMINATING CoMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PRocEDURES AND CANDIDATES 31 (1981)
[hereinafter DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING CoMMISSIONS). One of the principal purposes
of these commissions was to effectuate President Jimmy Carter's campaign promise
to select federal judges on the basis of professional competence instead of party or
personal loyalty. Id. Although most persons recommended by the district court
nominating commissions were "relatively inactive politically ... [t)he majority of the
relatively small group that was active participated in Democratic party matters." Id.
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continued, and indeed became even more accentuated, during
the Reagan and Bush administrations. 152
It should not be surprising that political considerations have
influenced the selection of federal judges. After all, the appointment oflife-tenuredjudges provides a President with an opportunity-perhaps the most significant opportunity-to have a
long-term influence on the direction of the country and its legal
system. Moreover, the high professional status historically
associated with a federal judgeship provides a President with
a vehicle to reward important political supporters. But no one
has seriously suggested that the exclusive criterion for selection
to the federal bench should be the political credentials and
affiliations of a potential candidate. 153 No one claims that the
federal judiciary should be staffed by politically well-connected
or ideologically congenial people who do not have the intellectual or character-related resources to do the work the nation has
entrusted to its courts. 154 To say that the President has the
unfettered prerogative to nominate a person for federal judicial
office, or that the Senate can grant or deny confirmation on any
basis it deems appropriate, 155 is not to suggest that either
should be oblivious to the professional qualifications of federal
judge candidates. At the very least, it is "perfectly sensible for
the Senate to review a candidate's professional experience to
determine whether she meets some baseline standard of legal
and intellectual competence."156

at 121. With respect to the circuit court selection process, 79% of those persons
recommended by the commissions to President Carter for nomination were Democrats.
LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES COURT JUIXJE NOMINATING
COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PRocEDURES AND CANDIDATES 138 (1980) [hereinafter CIRcurr
JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION).
152. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on
a Tradition., 74 JUDICATURE 294, 303-04 (1991) (noting that, as of the spring of 1991,
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush had failed to name a single Democrat
to the circuit courts).
153. Indeed, the American Bar Association has committed itself to the proposition
that "[t]he selection of judges should be non-political." JUDICIAL ADMIN. DMSION,
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION 51 (1990)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
154. Cf. HOWARD, supra note 72, at 93 (arguing that "professional competence" is
a prerequisite to being a circuit judge because, [o]f all the filters through which
potential judges must pass, the one with the most far-reaching implications is the
dictate of custom and the bar that circuit judges must be qualified lawyers").
155. See Monaghan, supra note 138, at 1207 ("We are better off recognizing a
virtually unlimited political license in the Senate not to confirm nominees.").
156. Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation. Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1186
(1988). Professor Carter's comments on the Senate's interest in scrutinizing the
competence and qualifications of federal judges applies even more forcefully to the
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B. Merit-Based Qualifications
To say that the President and Senate have an interest, if not
a duty, to construct and apply some "baseline standard" of
competence to judicial candidates is not to suggest that the
establishment or application of such a standard is easy or
uncontroversial. 157 Although "appointment-makers should, in the
public interest, set as their goal the naming of 'the very best'
persons available," 158 there exists little consensus concerning the
qualities that would satisfy such a goal. 159 To appreciate how
problematic qualitative, or at least comparative, judgments can
be in this context, 160 one need only recall the highly critical, even
incredulous, reaction to President Bush's reference to thenJudge Clarence Thomas as the best qualified person available
for appointment to the Supreme Court. 161
But what of the more modest notion that we can articulate
basic standards with which to evaluate the competence and
forecast the accomplishment of potential federal judges? While
even the possibility of establishing such basic standards has
been questioned, 162 scholars and persons who have been involved

President's interest in nominating and having confirmed people who are not simply
perceived as otherwise incompetent political hacks or cronies. To the extent that the
President's legacy is likely to be evaluated by the long-term influence and contributions to the law of his appointments to the federal courts, it ·is in his interest to
appoint people who are highly qualified.
157. Professor Carter recently suggested that "[w)e as a nation, like the Senate
as a body, share no consensus on what qualifications a nominee ought to have, for the
Supreme Court or for anything else." STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS:
CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPolNTMENTS PROCESS 162 (1994). Carter characterized past
efforts "to set forth the basic qualifications that federal judges should have" as having
"foundered on the rocks of consensus building." Id. at 164.
158. CHASE, supra note 147, at 66.
159. Id. (claiming that former Attorney General Nichols deB. Katzenbach used to
ask, "How do you determine who is 'the very best?'" and referring to such a standard
as "will-o'-the-wisp"); see also Robert P. Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for
Quality and Representativeness, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 409, 417 (1981) (noting that
"no consensus exists as to which qualities make an individual 'the best' candidate for
a judgeship").
160. The fact that standards for determining the best candidates for the federal
bench are so illusive does not stop commentators from concluding that the selection
system often fails to produce such candidates. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 72, at 101
("The defect of the system is that circuit judgeships do not necessarily go to the most
qualified persons.").
161. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Winners and Losers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1991, at Al7.
162. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 157, at 165 (discussing "our inability to find a
public language in which to discuss the qualifications of potential judges for public
office"); Carl Tobias,RethinkingFederalJudicialSelection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257,
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in the judicial selection process have proposed criteria for the
evaluation of potential and actual nominees. Some of these
efforts have resulted in quite general and abstract standards.
For example, in its 1990 Standards Relating to Court Organization, the American Bar Association (ABA) advanced the
following criteria for evaluating judicial qualifications:
Judges should have superior self-discipline, moral courage,
and sound judgment. They should be able to listen readily
to others and to be detached, even-handed, and decisive.
They should have a breadth of education sufficient to understand the variety of problems that come before the courts.
They should be professionally qualified as lawyers so that
they can interpret and apply the law competently. They
should have had experience in making practical and critical
judgments concerning human relations. 163
Elsewhere, the ABA, with specific reference to the federal
judiciary, has defined professional competence as encompassing
"such qualities as intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and
analytical ability, industry, diligence, knowledge of the law and
professional experience." 164
Other efforts to prescribe standards of judicial quality have
been similarly vague. During the Kennedy administration, criteria
were established for determining what constituted a "good"
appointment to the federal bench165 qualities including: "unquestioned ability," "incorruptible character," "firm judicial temperament," and "the rare inner quality to know when to temper
justice with mercy." 166 During the Eisenhower administration,
1262 (noting the difficulty of evaluating President Jimmy Carter's appointees to the
federal bench, particularly because of"the difficulty of articulating parameters which
· accurately measure quality").
163. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 153, at 49-50.
164. AMERICAN BAR .AssoclATION, SrANDING CoMMI'ITEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT
IT Is AND How IT WORKS 3 (1988) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMMITTEE].
The ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary has been involved in the
evaluation of nominees to the federal bench since 1948, and its involvement has been
among the most significant factors in efforts to articulate and apply a set of professional standards for the screening of federal judges. See Robert D. Raven, Judging
the Judges: The American Bar Association's Role in the Screening of Judicial
Nominees, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND PoLITICS 79 (Henry J. Abraham
et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter JUDICIAL SELECTION]; see also CHASE, supra note 147, at
120-04.
.
165. See CHASE, supra note 147, at 67. Among those responsible for developing these
criteria was Justice Byron White. Id.
166. Id.
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officially promulgated criteria included the need to be an "outstanding lawyer and leader in the community from which he
comes" as well as a person whose "personal and professional
reputation" was "beyond reproach." 167
The Carter administration, which committed itself to making
special efforts to seek qualified judicial nominees and established district and circuit court nominating committees toward
that end, 168 was only slightly more successful in establishing
concrete standards for evaluation. 169 An Executive Order issued
by President Jimmy Carter called for the selection of persons
with the following: "a reputation for, integrity, good character,
and common sense"; "a reputation for being, fair, experienced,
even-tempered and free of biases"; "sound physical and mental
health"; and "outstanding legal ability and competence, as
evidenced by substantial legal experience, ability to deal with
complex legal problems, aptitude for legal scholarship and
writing, and familiarity with courts and their processes." 170
Scholarly efforts to establish standards have been similarly
general and vague. For example, Professor Tobias recently
argued that only "those attorneys who will be excellent judges"
should be appointed to the federal bench. 171 The qualities he
listed as constituting excellence include the following: involvement "in extremely rigorous legal activity"; high intelligence,
industriousness, and a balanced disposition; "broad intellect,
willingness to labor vigorously, and appropriately measured
judicial temperament"; and "impeccable integrity and substantial independence." 172 Professor Davidow, after noting the lack
of consensus on "which qualities make an individual 'the best'
candidate for a judgeship," concluded that "[t]he conventional

167. Id. at 67-68 (quoting William P. Rogers, Judicial Appointments in the Eisenhower Administration, 4.1 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'V 39-40 (1957)).
168. See Cmcurr JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION, supro note 151, at 23-29; DISTRICT
JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS, supra note 151, at 53-112.
169. For general discussions of the Carter administration's approach to judicial
selection, see DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS, supra note 151, at 27-86;
Griffin B. Bell, Federal Judicial Selection: The Carter Years, in JUDICIAL SELECTION,
supra note 164, at 25.
170. Exec. Order No. 12,097, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1979) (Standards and Guidelines for
the Merit Selection of United States District Judges (Nov. 8, 1978)), revoked by Exec.
Order No. 12,553, 3 C.F.R. 204, 210 (1987); see also Exec. Order No. 12,059, 3 C.F.R.
180 (1978) (United States Circuit Judge Nominating Commission (May 11, 1978)),
revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,305, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1982) (establishing similar criteria
for the nomination of circuit judges).
171. Tobias, supra note 162, at 1274.
172. Id. at 1274-75.
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wisdom deems important the personal attributes of honesty,
moral courage, diligence, courtesy, patience, decisiveness, independence, impartiality, open-mindedness, knowledge of the law,
and experience."173
·
A number of characteristics recur regularly in the various
efforts to construct a list of non-political qualifications. In no
special order, such a list would probably include integrity, 174
judgment, decisiveness, intellectual openness, even temperament, technical competence,175 independence, and impartiality. 176
173. Davidow, supra note 159, at 417. Over 25 years ago, Professor Rosenberg
noted that the "[j]udicial office today demands the best possible men, not those of
merely average ability who were gray and undistinguished as lawyers and who will
be just as drab as judges." Maurice Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They
Strainable?, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1966). Rosenberg went on to list 23 attributes that would best equip a lawyer to become a trial judge. Id. at 1066-67.
174. According to the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary, "[i]ntegrity is self-defining." ABA STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 164, at
3. Although this is something of an overstatement, the ABA's accompanying reference
to "character and general reputation in the legal community," along with one's
"industry and diligence," represents a fairly uncontroversial list of at least some of
the qualities encompassed by integrity. Id. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Living
in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 855 (1987) (defining integrity in Aristotelian terms
of"[a] person whose soul has ... 'friendly feelings' toward itself," as well as in terms
of "steadiness of action and purpose, the reliability of character, the dignity of selfrespect that a person shows in relations with others and in his or her conduct
generally").
·
175. By "technical competence" we mean understanding and familiarity with the
legal concepts and doctrines, as well as methodologies and modes of argument, of
which the law consists. Of course, no person will have a complete mastery of all of
the legal materials that are likely to be implicated in every case over which he or she
is likely to preside during a judicial career. Technical competence thus includes the
ability to master, or at least gain a reasonable understanding of, the legal materials
relevant to the resolution of any given case. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
Rule 1.1 (1983) ("Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation:).
Interestingly, the American Bar Association Code ofJudicial Conduct has no provision
dealing specifically with judicial competence. See SPECIAL COMM. ON STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, AMERICAN BARAsSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972)
[hereinafter CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT].
176. Independence, of course, is widely viewed as a hallmark of the American
judiciary. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 175, Canon 1 (entitled: "A Judge
Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary"; providing that "a[n]
independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society").
Independence is embodied in Article Ill's tenure and salary protections for federal
judges. See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1. Impartiality is also a central feature of the judicial
process, a fact embodied in our constitutional notions of due process as well as in the
ethical rules that apply to the judiciary. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 175,
Canon 3 ("A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently.").
Some would, no doubt, include empathy and compassion in a list of characteristics
essential to judging. For example, the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary,
when evaluating judicial temperament, considers the "compassion" and "sensitivity"
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Although these qualities may be difficult to define with precision, and although they may be even more difficult to apply to
the evaluation of a:ny given judicial candidate, 177 they should be
part of a baseline set of qualifications for any judicial office.

C. Distinguishing Between Trial and Appellate Judges
The aforementioned characteristics would represent the minimum requirements in a merit-based standard used in assessing
the suitability of potential candidates for the federal bench. In
our view, any potential nominee, whether for the federal district,
federal circuit, or other Article III court, 178 should possess as
many of these characteristics as possible; persons without these
characteristics should not be nominated to a federal judgeship
and, if nominated, should not be confirmed. 179
of a prospective nominee to the federal bench. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note
164, at 4. In addition, some judges and scholars maintain that compassion is a central
component of the judicial process. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (remarking that
"compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging"); William J. Brennan,
Jr., Reason, Passion, and the "Progress ofLaw," 42 REC. OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 948, 959 (Dec. 1987) ("Sensitivity to one's intuitive and passionate
responses, and awareness of the range of human experience, is therefore not only an
inevitable but a desirable part of the judicial process, an aspect more to be nurtured
than feared."); Judith Resnik, Changing Criteria for Judging Judges, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 889, 893 (1990) (remarking that a new requirement for Supreme Court justices
is to have "compassion and concern" for those who appear before them); Richard C.
Reuben, Justice Defined, 80 A.B.A. J. 46, 47 (July 1994) (discussing Justice Harry A.
Blackmun's career and emphasizing the role of compassion in his judging). Some
might believe that compassion and empathy do not easily coexist with impartiality,
detachment, and disinterestedness, standard qualifications for judges. While we are
quite comfortable with the notion that an element of compassion or empathy is
desirable in the judicial process, we omit it from our list of baseline criteria.
177. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that "it is virtually impossible to
assess accurately the integrity, intelligence, independence, and judicial temperament
that specific judges have." Tobias, supra note 162, at 1262.
178. We believe the characteristics discussed in the text provide a standard against
which any potential federal judge should be assessed. This would be true with respect
to nominees to the Supreme Court, circuit courts, district courts, or other specialized
Article III courts, although the standard should be applied more rigorously to
nominees to the Supreme Court. In our view, at least as an ideal matter, it would also
be appropriate to evaluate potential candidates for Article I courts against the same
general standard.
179. Any attempt to establish a formulaic approach to assessing how a nominee
measures up to the characteristics we have described, or others we can imagine,
probably would be unwise. While one could well imagine that a candidate's failure
to meet any of these criteria would result in disqualification, in most cases the obvious
disqualifying factor would have been identified in the vetting process that typically
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Assuming that all individuals considered for federal judicial
appointments should, at a minimum, satisfy these criteria, are
there sensible grounds to distinguish between individuals depending upon the particular judicial position for which they are
being considered? In particular, are there grounds to distinguish
between those persons who are likely to be reasonably good or
competent trial judges from those persons who are likely to be
reasonably good or competent appellate judges? If there are,
presumably a rational selection process should reflect such a
distinction. In other words, once a person satisfies the baseline
standard we have suggested, is it reasonable to assume that we
can expect any person to function as well as any other person
in either trial or appellate capacity?
According to many observers, trial and appellate judging are
distinguishable in significant ways, which suggests that trial
and appellate judges are not interchangeable. 18° For example,
the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary has
established evaluation criteria that acknowledge differences
between trial and appellate judges. 181 Regarding standards for
appellate judges, the Committee concludes:
Recognizing that an appellate judge deals primarily with
records, briefs, appellate advocates and colleagues (in contrast to witnesses, parties, jurors, live testimony and the
theater of the courtroom), the Committee may place somewhat less emphasis on the importance of trial experience as
a qualification for the appellate courts. 182

1. Distinctions in Intellectual Ability-The ABA Committee's
analysis suggests two primary, functional distinctions between
trial and appellate judges. First, nominees for the appellate
courts are expected to have "an especially high degree of
precedes the decision to nominate. Consequently, there almost always will be room
for legitimate (i.e. not politically driven) debate and disagreement as to whether any
candidate measures up to any merit-based standard.
180. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 565
(1969) (asserting that "[t]he use of district judges [on appellate courts] does present
a special problem with respect to its impact on the quality of review, since the
qualities that make a good trial judge are somewhat different from those which make
a good appellate judge").
181. However, the Committee states that "[s]ubstantial trial experience (as a
lawyer or a trial judge) is important for prospective nominees to both the appellate
and the trial courts." ABA STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 164, at 3.
182. Id.
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scholarship and academic talent." 183 This expectation is most
likely based on the notion that appellate judges have broader
responsibilities than do their trial court colleagues. While it is
the primary duty of trial judges to decide the case sub judice,
the ABA Committee endorses the view that appellate judges have
the additional responsibilities of harmonizing the law and
integrating it into a coherent whole. 184 Arguably, these additional
responsibilities entail certain qualities and skills that trialjudges
may not be expected to possess, such as the ability to take a long
view of the applicable legal principles and the additional capacity
for reflection that will take into account the "sober second
thought" of the community. 185
The survey data reflect that sitting judges have internalized
this distinction between the trial and appellate function. For
example, in his study of the Second, Fifth, and District of
Columbia Circuits, Professor Howard asked circuit judges to compare their jobs with those of federal district judges. 186 Respondents reported that a primary functional distinction was that trial
judges generally are called upon to make "instant" judgments
while circuit judges were called upon to make "reflective"
judgments. 187 As one circuit judge reported, "our work is far more
deliberate and supported by reason. The district judge must
decide on the spur of the moment most of the time." 188
The notion that trial and appellate functions differ in the
respect that appellate judges should have a greater aptitude and
disposition for scholarly analysis finds some support in Professor
Slotnick's investigation of the judicial nominees presented by
President Carter to the Senate Judiciary Committee during the

183. Id. at 2.
184. Id. At least in common law contexts, appellate courts are more likely to be
viewed as responsible for the law's evolution, its reform, and its progress.
185. See Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV.
4, 25 (1936). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME CoURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 23-28 (1962) (arguing that a government should
serve enduring values and that the judiciary is best situated to protect such values).
186. HOWARD, supra note 72, at 134. Almost half(46%) of the circuitjudges polled
had previously served as trial judges. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 134-35. Howard expected his survey to show, among other things, that
"district judges have greater responsibility to ensure justice in individual cases while
circuit judges grapple more with legal doctrine." Id. at 134. Yet only three of the
surveyed judges reported this distinction, and Howard concluded that his survey
"cracked orthodox molds," because the survey responses stressed operational discrepancies. Id. The general responses, however, do seem subject to an interpretation supporting the "orthodox" understanding that Howard expected.
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96th Congress. 189 Among other things, Professor Slotnick discovered that circuit court nominees were more likely to have served
in "prestigious law clerkships" earlier in their careers, that they
were "more likely to have obtained law school honors than their
district judge counterparts," and that they had "considerably more
prolific scholarly publication records" than the district court nominees.190 These findings led him to conclude that, once political
considerations were put aside, the Carter Administration in fact
made distinctions between "the credentials and backgrounds"
ofits nominees for the district and circuit courts. 191 For Slotnick,
these findings lent support to the "conventional wisdom" that
"suggests that the more prestigious U.S. Courts of Appeals will
be staffed by judges who are 'better' trained and more 'qualified'
in several respects than their counterparts on the U.S. District
Courts. "192
These analyses reflect a widespread view that circuit judges
should have a greater demonstrated capacity for exceptional

189. Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Trial and Appellate Judges: How Do They Differ?,
36 W. POL. Q. 570 (1983).
190. Id. at 577-78.
191. Id. at 578.
192. Id. at 570. Professor Slotnick's analysis is consistent with the individual case
versus "long view" distinction between district court and circuit court functions we
have previously suggested:
The nature of the aggregate backgrounds and experiences offederal trialjudges
suggest an adjudication process attuned directly to the specific problems of the
litigants involved[,] decided by judges closely tied to the districts in which they
work. The experiences and backgrounds of appellate judges, however, appear to
result in a circuit bench which is more nationally oriented and which will be more
prone to take a broader view of cases before it-perhaps with a greater eye
towards their public policy significance.

Id. at 578.
We tend to agree with Professor Slotnick's suggestion that the customary mode of
thought includes the notion that appellate judges should be more capable of engaging
in high-level intellectual analysis and reflection about the law than their trial judge
counterparts. Nevertheless, we note concern with some of the factors he uses to support
the correlation between a candidate's background and the likelihood that she will
possess the requisite intellectual qualities. For example, Professor Slotnick concluded
that district nominees "were nearly three and a half times less likely thari the circuit
nominees to have attended Ivy league law schools." Id. at 573. Then he equated the
"prestige" of the candidates' law school with the quality of their training. Id. In our
view, the notion that there is a direct correlation between the intellectual capacity
of a lawyer and the "eliteness" of her law school is quite problematic. That Professor
Slotnick himself is troubled by such a correlation is suggested by his description of
an "elite" law school training as "possiblyO 'better.'" Id. at 574. Other factors he
examines, including honors earned while in law school and scholarly publication record,
id., are more reliable though still imperfect indicators of intellectual prowess.

WINTER 1995]

District Court Judges Sitting By Designation 395

intellectual acumen than persons who would qualify for service
on the district court. 193 All judges should possess a capacity for
sophisticated and high-level thinking about legal concepts and
doctrines; it would be difficult to argue against the notion that
we should strive for a system where all of our judges, whether
trial or appellate, are the brightest and wisest people available. 194
Although all judges should be capable, a rational federal judicial
selection process should be especially rigorous when evaluating
the intellectual capability and potential of candidates for the
circuit courts.
2. Distinctions in Temperament-Trial and appellate judges
may also be distinguished based on characteristics other than
intellectual ability. Principal among these is judicial temperament. In the present context, temperament might be understood
as a general feature of one's personality or character that affects
one's ability to adapt to the demands and expectations of the
professional environment. 195 The ABA Standing Committee on
Federal Judiciary lists judicial temperament as one of three
general categories of professional qualifications that it considers
in evaluating federal judicial nominees. 196 In assessing temperament, the Committee "considers ... the prospective nominee's
compassion, decisiveness, open-mindedness, sensitivity, courtesy,
patience, freedom from bias and commitment to equaljustice."197
Although there has been little systematic effort to study the
suitability of different types of persons for trial, as opposed to
appellate, positions, there is reason to believe that the sort of
person who might be well-disposed temperamentally to function

193. But cf Carrington, supra note 180, at 565-66 (arguing that, although the
qualities of a good trial judge may vary from those of a good appellate judge, the
differences are not very significant and the qualities required of an appellate judge
may be more common than those required of a trial judge). In this regard, it is worth
noting that, in a relatively small number of cases, district judges review in the first
instance decisions of federal administrative agencies, an appellate duty different from
the usual case before the trial judge. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988) (certain
bankruptcy court decisions); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) (social security disability benefit
decisions).
194. Those who suggest otherwise may be subjected to ridicule as was Senator
Roman Hruska when, in arguing for the confirmation of G. Harrold Carswell to the
Supreme Court, he maintained that mediocre people are entitled to representation
on the Court. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 79 (6th ed. 1993).
195. The United States Circuit Court Nominating Committee, established during
the Carter administration, evaluated prospective circuit court nominees on their
"demeanor, character and personality indicative ofjudicial temperament." CIRcuIT JUDGE
NOMINATING COMMISSION, supra note 151, at 105.
196. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 164, at 4.
197. Id.
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comfortably and effectively as a trial judge might not be as well
disposed to function as an appellate judge. In one oft~e leading
efforts to study the attitudes of circuit judges toward their jobs
and their district court colleagues, 198 Professor Howard reported
that seven of the thirty-five Fifth Circuit judges interviewed199
differentiated sharply between the appellate and trial functions,
"even distinguish[ing] the talents required according to personal
'temperament.' "200 Severaljudges "opposed usingvisitingdistrict
judges to help meet their caseload on grounds that trial judges
often found it difficult 'to think like appellate judges.' "201 Elsewhere, Howard reported that one-fifth of the judges he Interviewed "invoked personality to differentiate suitability for trial
and appellate work.'' 202 These findings suggest that the normal
tasks of trial and district judges may differ in ways significant
enough to raise doubts concerning whether the same person can
perform each set of tasks with equal ease or effectiveness.
This point was evidenced further in an investigation by William
Kitchin of the attitudes of district judges towards their jobs. 203
Kitchin inquired into the judges' impressions of how their roles
differed from the roles of circuit judges and discovered that the
district judges did perceive differences between trial and appellate styles. 204 First, the district judges deal with litigants,
witnesses, and the whole range of actors who populate the trial
process, while the circuit judge is rarely required to relate, on
a personal level, with these actors. 205 Second, "district judges are
individual decision makers whereas circuit judges are collegial

198. See HOWARD, supra note 72, at 125-57.
199. See id. at 304-05 (describing interview and methods).
200. Id. at 137.
201. Id. at 137 n.g. Oi;ie circuit judge expressed the following sense of the differentiation between circuit and district judging: "I was never interested in becoming a
district judge. I would be bored to death listening to witnesses. I am interested in broad
questions, in principles." Id. Another observation offered by a circuit judge was: "I
couldn't be a district judge. I don't have confidence in myself to make quick decisions
daily or to have to listen all day to inept lawyers." Id.
202. Id. at 97.
203. WlLUAM l Km::HIN, FEDERAL DlsmJcr Jt.loom AN ANAusls OF JunICIAL PE!a:PnONS
(1978) (surveying district judges from the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits).
204. Id. at 57.
205. See id. at 57--58. One Southern district judge thought it an important distinction that district judges are exposed to the outward behavior of witnesses, while
"appellate judges read a record like reading a newspaper: they get the impressions
of another human being, of what he saw and heard. They see only what the reporter
got." Id. at 58.
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decision makers. "206 District judges reported a preference for
"their solitary style of decision making. "207 As one judge noted:
On the district level, you are your own boss. Up there, there
are at least two others you have to compromise your views
with. That brings about giving and swapping back and forth.
The district judge has more independence than this. 208

3. Evaluation-These studies suggest that the functional
differences between trial and appellate courts frequently demand
quite different sorts of skills, dispositions, and temperaments.
They indicate that the work of processing trials and appeals is
sufficiently different that persons who can effectively and
comfortably perform the tasks demanded by the former may not
be as adept at the latter. The studies show that judges themselves distinguish between the talents required to perform well
at the trial and appellate levels, relating the differences to
differences in personal "temperament."209
We are not aware of any reports that a person who has been
offered a position as a federal circuit judge has rejected the offer
because of a view that her talent and temperament were better
suited for a district court position, or vice versa. 210 We suspect,
however, that such a decision has been reached more than once
in the past. We further suspect that a candid self-assessment
by many persons who now sit on the federal circuit and district
courts would lead to a conclusion analogous to the federal circuit
judge who was reported to have said: "I wouldn't care to be a trial
judge and don't now. It's a good thing, too. I don't have the
temperament. "211
We do not mean to suggest that the skills, dispositions, and
temperaments necessary to be effective trial and appellate judges
206. Id. at 59.
207. Id.
208. Id. Similarly, Howard found that circuit judges differentiated the functions
and operations of trial and intermediate appellate courts in part on the basis of"solo
versus collective responsibility." HOWARD, supra note 72, at 135. As one judge put it,
at the district court level, "your calendar is your own ... and yourself is the only person
you have to convince." Id.
209. See supra Part IV.C.2.
210. In his study of circuit judges, Professor Howard noted that one interviewee,
deciding whether he would prefer an appointment to the district or circuit court,
observed several trials and reported: "It was so boring! All that time spent on the
calendar, getting the case to trial. The pace was so slow .... How they have the
patience to listen! Some enjoy it, however, God bless 'em." HOWARD, supra note 72, at
135.
211. Id. at 97.
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are inherently incompatible or mutually exclusive. There are
certainly many persons who can function effectively in each
position, and many distinguished judges have done so. Many
federal district judges have served with distinction as state
appellate judges before their appointment to the federal bench,
and many federal circuit judges have served effectively as state
or federal trial judges before their "elevation" to the court of
appeals. 212 The point worth noting is that the personal and
professional qualities required for effective and satisfying service
at both the appellate and trial levels are not necessarily transferrable.
D. Implications for Evaluating the Practice
of District Judges Sitting by Designation

Given our evaluation of the elements of a rational process for
selecting federal judges and our assessment of the distinctions
between the temperament, intellectual ability, and functions of
trial and appellate judges, several concerns arise with respect
to the current practice of utilizing district judges on circuit court
panels.
The treatment of all trial and appellate judges as interchangeable raises troublesome questions of constitutional policy. These
questions were addressed in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok. 213 In Glidden, the Court was
faced with constitutional challenges to the composition of two
appellate panels, one from the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and one from the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. 214 In each case, one criminal and
the other civil, the panel in question consisted of two judges who
were from the respective circuit and a third judge who was not:
one judge participating on the Second Circuit panel was an active

212. Sheldon Goldman, Federal Judicial Recruitment, in THE AMERICAN COURTS:
A CRITICAL AsSESSMENT 189, 198 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); see
also HOWARD, supra note 72, at 113 (finding in a study of three circuits that 40% of
judges were promoted from the district court); Susan Haire et al.,An Intercircuit Profile
ofJudges on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 78 JUDICATURE 101, 102 (1994) (reporting that,
of judges on the courts of appeals between 1891 and 1992, those who had previously
served on the district courts ranged from 59.6% in the Sixth Circuit to 16. 7% in the
D.C. Circuit; overall figure for all circuits not given but appears to be about 40%).
213. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
214. Id. at 532-33.
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judge from the United States Court of Claims sitting by designation; one judge participating on the D.C. Circuit panel was a
retired judge sitting by designation from the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals. 215 The Supreme Court granted
review in the cases "[b]ecause of the significance of the 'designation' issue for the federal judicial system."216
The principal basis for the ch~llenge to the participation of the
designated judges in Glidden was not just that they were not
regular judges of the circuit courts in question. Instead, the
appellants based their challenge on the claim that the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were not
courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution. 217
They argued that litigants before Article III courts had a right
to have their case adjudicated only by judges who enjoyed the
life tenure and salary protections embodied in Article 111. 218 The
Court, in large part overruling its prior decisions holding that
the two courts in question were constituted pursuant to Article
I, held that both were Article III courts whose judges did enjoy
the relevant Article ill protections.219 The Court therefore rejected
the appellants' constitutional challenge. 220
Of particular interest for present purposes is Justice Douglas's
dissent. In concluding that the participation of the two designated
judges violated Article IIl, 221 Justice Douglas emphasized two
points. The first concerned the principle ofjudicial independence.
Justice Douglas noted that, as Article Ijudges,222 they were not
beneficiaries of Article Ill's tenure and salary protections, protections whose importance to "the independence of the judiciary
needs no argument. "223

215. Id. at 532 .
. 216. Id. at 533.
217. Id. The Supreme Court had held earlier that both courts were legislative courts
established pursuant to Article I of the Constitution. Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. 553 (1933) (Court of Claims); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) (Court
of Customs Appeals).
218. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 533.
219. Id. at 584.
220. Id. at 584-85. The concurring Justice concluded that the Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had been transformed into Article III courts
by Congress after the Supreme Court had found them to be Article I courts. Id. at 585
(Clark, J., concurring).
221. See id. at 606 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
222. In Justice Douglas's view, the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals were Article I courts. Id. at 592.
223. Id. at 594.

400

University of MWiigan Journal of Law &form

[VOL. 28:2

The second point emphasized by Justice Douglas related to the
general issue of the judges' function and qualifications. 224 Justice
Douglas expressed concern that Article I courts, unlike their
Article III counterparts, were not bound by such constitutional
limitations as those found in the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial. 225 Justice Douglas was also concerned that the
designated judges were people whose general background and
qualifications might not be well-suited for the business ofArticle
III courts. 226 Justice Douglas noted that "[a]n appointment is
made by the President and confirmed by the. Senate in light of
the duties of the particular office. "227 A President "might never
dream" of entrusting the ·powers of an Article III judge to a
nominee of an Article I court or an administrative agency: "The
tasks are so different, the responsibilities and the qualifications
are so diverse that it is difficult for one who knows the federal
system to see how in the world of practical affairs these offices
are interchangeable."228 To treat Article I and Article III judges
as interchangeable, Douglas argued, would be to risk thwarting
or perverting the judicial selection process ordained by the
Constitution: "Federal judges named to Article III courts are
picked in light of the functions entrusted to them. No one knows
whether a President would have appointed to an Article III court
a man he named to an Article I court. "229
Perhaps the central concern expressed in the Glidden dissent
was captured in the statement with which we began this article: that "we subtly undermine the constitutional system when
we treat federal judges as fungible." 230 We believe this concern
is also relevant when federal district judges, assigned to sit by
designation on appellate panels, are treated as fungible with
federal circuit judges. To be sure, Justice Douglas's admonition
was expressed in the context of the admixing of functions of
judges whose constitutional pedigrees were quite different;
unlike Article I judges, federal district judges enjoy the same
salary and tenure protections enjoyed by their circuit court

224. Justice Douglas conceded that the personal ability, character, and qualifications of the two designated judges were not challenged by the appellants. Id. at
589-90.
225. Id. at 600-02; see U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
226. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 603.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 604.
230. Id.
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colleagues. 231 Nevertheless, many of the functional distinctions
between Article I and Article III judges mentioned by Douglas
are also applicable to district and circuit judges.
AB we have argued earlier, a merit-based process for selecting
judges should take seriously the qualifications of all potential
candidates, including their temperament and experience. In
evaluating a person's suitability for a judicial position, such a
process should take into account the differences between the
functions of courts that conduct trials and those that decide
appeals. Such a process should recognize that a person might
be well suited and qualified to serve in a trial, but not in an
·appellate, capacity. In Glidden, Justice Douglas noted that
people "of highest quality chosen as Article I judges might
never pass muster for Article III courts."232 In our view, the
same could be said when comparing potential district and
circuit court nominees. To ignore this reality would represent
an example of what Douglas referred to as a "light-hearted
treatment of Article III functions. "233
Justice Douglas's concerns reveal an appropriate understanding of Article III and its design for the federal judicial system.
These concerns led him to conclude that treating Article I and
Article III judges as fungible would compromise impermissibly
the independence of the federal judiciary and its capacity to
safeguard constitutional rights. We do not maintain that the
pervasive and routine utilization of district judges on appellate
panels raises precisely the same concerns as those to which
Douglas alluded; neither do we argue that the participation of
a district judge in any given case ought to be found constitutionally impermissible. 234 That the judges of all of the inferior

231. Even so, the dynamics of collegial decision-making may impose inhibitions
even among Article III judges. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
232. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 605 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas's observation was made in the context of evaluating the relative qualifications of Article I and
Article III judges "when tested by their record of tolerance for minorities and for their
respect of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 605-06. Presumably, candidates for positions on
all of the Article III courts should be tested for these qualities. But as we have noted
earlier, there are differences between the ideal profiles of candidates for trial and
appellate courts, aspects that a sensitive selection process should take into account.
233. Id. at 605.
.
234. Originalist interpretational theory has dominated much of the Supreme
Court's decisions applying Article III. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 22, at
86-87 n.8. Thus a constitutional attack on the use of district judges sitting on
appellate panels would be unlikely to succeed, given that the lower federal courts
were created by Congress and that trial and appellate judges were originally treated
as fungible. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text; see also Akhil R. Amar,
The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1510
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federal courts enjoy the independence contemplated by Article
III should ensure their capacity to protect the individual and
minority rights that were central to Justice Douglas's analysis.
Nonetheless, we believe that litigants who appear before the
federal courts of appeals have a legitimate expectation that the
judges before whom they appear will have been selected and
found qualified by reference to standards evaluating their
ability to exercise the appellate function. The pervasive use of
district judges on the circuit courts results in appellate decisionmaking undertaken by persons who have not been found qualified or suited to perform the appellate function and therefore
threatens to dilute the quality of justice on appeal.
Even if the concerns we have identified as associated with the
participation of district judges on appellate panels do not
amount to constitutional defects, they surely raise serious questions about the general integrity of current designation practices. To a significant extent, the assignment of district court
judges to appellate panels is driven by one simple fact: under
current circumstances, there simply are not enough circuit
judges available to fill the number of panels necessary to
process expeditiously the cases being filed in the circuit
courts. 235 Faced with this reality and with the failure of Congress to provide substantial relief, 236 the federal circuits have
had little choice but to utilize all of the resources available,
including district judges.
As we have suggested in this Article, however, using district
judges raises serious concerns. First, it threatens to undenmne
the rationality and integrity of the process of staffing the
federal courts. If the rationality of the selection process is
measured by the extent to which it is tailored to fill available
positions on the federal circuit courts with persons who have

(1990) (arguing that the framers considered all federal judges, supreme and inferior,
to be in "structural parity" with each other).
235. See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text. As we noted earlier, see supra
notes 45-46 and accompanying text, a second reason offered to explain the designation of district judges to sit on the circuit courts is to provide orientation and
understanding concerning those courts' operations. But that justification cannot
explain or justify the pervasiveness of the current practice.
236. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. Numerous proposals have
been made to stem the tide of cases filed in the lower federal courts. These have
included significant increases in the number of federal judgeships authorized by
Congress, see, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 6, at 53; expediting the process of filling
current vacancies on the courts, see, e.g., Henry J. Reske, Keeping Pace With Judicial
Vacancies, 80 A.B.A. J. 34 (July 1994); and curtailing federal jurisdiction, see, e.g.,
BAKER, supra note 3, at 187, 190.
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been found qualified to be appellate judges, then the current
system must be found wanting. Nationally, nearly twenty
percent of circuit court panels consist of at least one district
judge, 237 and in some circuits the percentage is higher. 238 Particularly troublesome is the fact that in some cases a majority of
an appellate panel consists of districtjudges. 239 Even assuming
that the current selection process screens all potential and
actual nominees for Article III judgeships on the basis of a set
of merit-based qualifications, there is no evidence to suggest
that current screening practices account for the characteristics
that distinguish between potentially good trial and appellate
judges.
We have already acknowledged that the case for distinguishing c~mpetence in potential trial and appellate judges can be
overstated. There are certainly many individuals who possess
the temperament, intellect, and experience to qualify for either
trial or appellate positions. 240 But it is just as likely that many
of those district judges now asked to serve on the federal
courts of appeals are not particularly qualified for or interested in the position. To the extent they are not, the quality of
appellate justice-something to which we assume that every
nominating President and confirming Senate would express a
commitment-is destined to suffer.

237. See tbl. 1, supra p. 365.
238. See tbl. 2, supra p. 367.
239. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
240. A large percentage of nominees to the federal circuit courts have had prior
experience as trialjudges. See, e.g., CIRCUIT COURT NOMINATING COMMISSION, supra
note 151, at 134, 143-44 (reporting that 26% of the first and second round candidates recommended for nomination to the circuit courts by the United States Circuit
Court Nominating Commission during the Carter administration had been federal
district judges and that, by May 1979, 12 of the 28 persons nominated had been
district judges). In addition, many observers and judges believe that experience as
a trial judge is an especially useful, if not indispensable, qualification for the
appellate bench. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 72, at 107-08 ("In theory, the best
training for appellate courts is practical experience in advocacy and on a trial
bench."). Presumably, however, many persons who might not have the interest in or
the qualifications for a position on the circuit court will acquire both during their
tenure on the district court. More importantly, both the President and the Senate
will have a second chance to evaluate the qualifications of sitting district judges
considered for elevation to the circuit court in light of the specific and even distinctive requirements for the latter position. Neither the President nor the Senate, of
course, has the opportunity to evaluate the appellate judging credentials of a
district judge designated by a circuit for work on a circuit court panel.
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CONCLUSION

From the perspective of the circuit courts in need of a stopgap measure in the face of congressional default, reliance on
district judges is certainly rational, but such reliance cannot
be viewed as an optimal response to a difficult problem. 241
Frequent utilization of district judges can be a disruptive
influence on the work of a circuit: it can lead to inconsistency
in circuit precedents and doctrine, reduced collegiality within
panels, restraint on the candid and robust exchange of views
between all members of a panel, and greater pressure for en
bane review. 242 It can also create logistical problems and other
inefficiencies, complicating the circuit's ability to decide and
process the cases on its docket. 243
241. As we noted earlier, most of the circuits invite newly appointed district
judges to sit as part of a larger effort towards orientation and socialization. See
supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. While, at least in theory, many of the
criticisms of the general practice of circuit court reliance upon district judges would
also apply here, we find them less troubling than where even experienced district
judges are called upon solely for the purpose of helping the circuit manage its
docket. Presumably, fewer cases overall would be affected ifthe designation process
were used solely, or primarily, for an orientation purpose.
242. See supra Parts Il.B-111.
243. Several judges have suggested to us in informal conversations that district
judges may be less efficient in reaching decisions and writing opinions in their ·
appellate cases than their circuit court colleagues. Some inefficiency may be unavoidable. For· example, to the extent that trial and appellate decision-making
involve different mental processes and skills, a district judge may need more time to
process a case than an experienced Circuit judge would need. Moreover, when a
district judge visits the court of appeals, he retains responsibility for managing his
own docket. Many district judges will continue to work on their own files even while
preparing for appellate arguments and reaching decisions in their appellate cases.
And once their visit to the circuit court concludes, the district judge must return to
his court and assume the often very hectic and demanding schedule he left behind.
In this context, it would not be surprising if some district judges would, at least
temporarily, postpone processing of some of their -appellate cases. This, in turn,
would create an additional set of obstacles to the circuit's ability to terminate the
relevant cases expeditiously.
These observations suggest another, perhaps less visible cost associated with
district judges sitting on appellate panels. Not only does the practice entail a
potential cost in terms of the circuit court's ability to process those cases in which
district judges participate, it also entails a cost to the processing of cases pending in
the district courts. While the district judge sits on the court of appeals, his ability to
devote attention to the processing of his own docket will, at the very least, be
reduced. And when his visit to the court of appeals concludes, the time necessary to
complete the process of writing and circulating opinions will continue to detract
from his ability to handle his responsibilities in the district court. Thus even if the
overall benefits to the circuit court of utilizing the district judge outweigh the costs,
the costs to the efficient operation of the district courts remain.
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From the perspective of those who are constitutionally responsible for the selection of the men and women who preside
over the district courts, the rationality of continued reliance
upon federal district judges-at least the sort of extensive
reliance that we have described in this Article-is a much
more serious question. Both the President and the Senate
have a significant interest in ensuring that all of those who
are entrusted with the power of the federal government have
been selected on the basis of their qualifications for the precise
functions that they will be called upon to exercise. This would
seem especially true in the case of federal judges who alone
among the officers of government are authorized to exercise
power for life.
What might be done to remedy or ameliorate the concerns
we have raised with respect to the current practice of designation? First and most obviously would be the complete discontinuation of the practice of designating district judges to sit
on appellate panels. We believe the problems set out earlier in
this Article are significant enough to warrant the abandonment of the routine reliance upon district judges to manage
the circuit courts' dockets.
Given the almost complete failure of the chroniclers of the
federal appellate caseload crisis to acknowledge the contribution that district judges now make to the processing of federal
appeals, one might think that stopping the flow of district
judges would have no discernible adverse effect on the circuit
courts. But as we have noted, district judges do provide a
major source of the personnel resources upon which the circuit
courts rely. Cutting off those resources is certain to exacerbate
the problems facing the circuit courts, and thus the chief judges of the circuits and others involved in policy-making in this
area would probably not view this with favor. 244
Nonetheless, if and to the extent that district judges are to be
used in the future for the sole purpose of processing the circuit
courts' caseload, we believe that those charged with circuit
244. As suggested earlier, although we believe that the routine utilization of
district judges by the circuit courts raises important questions of constitutional
policy, it is not our position that the practice is constitutionally invalid. As a
general matter, all Article III requires is that those who exercise the federal judicial
power enjoy life tenure and salary protections. See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1; see also
MAimN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENslONS IN THE AlLoCATION OF JUDICIAL Pl:>WER
53 (2d ed. 1990) (outlining job attributes of federal judges such as life tenure and
salary); Saphire & Solimine, supra note 22, at 85 (listing same benefits of federal
judgeships).
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court administration should make a concerted effort to utilize
only those district judges who express a particular interest in
serving. In the case of judges who already have served by
designation, only those judges who have demonstrated a particular interest and aptitude for working effectively on the circuit
court should be called upon to serve again. 245
We recognize that deciding who among the pool of available
district judges is most qualified for service on circuit court
panels will almost always involve a degree of speculation and
subjectivity. Even though sitting circuit judges may find it as
difficult to articulate and apply a set of performance-based
standards as those who have been in charge of nominating and
confirming federal judges in the first instance,246 circuit judges'
assessment of particular district judges' ability to function on
their panels is likely to be at least equally, and probably more,
well-informed and reliable. In any event, we believe that the
designating authorities have an obligation to be deliberative
and selective in their choices. 247
·

245. The chief judge of the circuit has responsibility for designating district
judges for appellate assignment. 28 U.S.C. § 292(a)(1988). In practice, the chief judge
may delegate, either formally or informally, some or all of that authority to the
circuit executive or other administrative personnel. See, e.g., Eleventh Circuit letter,
supra note 45, at 2 (showing that responsibility for selecting members of panels is
delegated to circuit executive). When such delegation takes place, the designation
process can become largely a clerical function. Whether or not such delegation takes
place, it is our sense that little systematic attention is given to the factors we
consider important in making informed assignments of district judges to appellate
duties.
In any event, we suspect that considerable discretion is now used in the determination of which judges will be called upon repeatedly to sit by designation on the circuit
courts. Our correspondence and conversations with circuit court administrators has
suggested that not all judges who serve by designation are invited back for subsequent
duty on the circuit courts. But it is not clear to us that these decisions are always
made on the basis of a careful consideration of which district judges are best suited
to perform the appellate function.
246. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of judges' descriptions of the different
characteristics needed to perform the trial or appellate function.
247. Indeed, it is difficult to see how our suggestion that district judges be
carefully evaluated before they are repeatedly invited back for circuit court duty
could be regarded as controversial. To the extent that the circuit courts rely on
district judges to manage their caseload, it is clearly in their interest to place the
principal burden on district judges who have demonstrated particular aptitude and
interest in performing an appellate function. Our impression, however, is that the ·
decision of whom should be invited back, and how often, is frequently made on a
relatively informal or ad hoc basis. To that extent, we would argue that selection of
designated district judges should be made in a more systematic and purposeful
manner.
AB we have noted, the justification for assigning district judges to sit on appellate panels is not limited to stemming the caseload crisis. Many circuits routinely
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In addition, if the current practice is to continue, it should
be acknowledged explicitly. The President and the Senate
should take the designation process into account in the selection and confirmation of federal district judges. From a practical and managerial standpoint, each has an important interest
in staffing all levels of the federal judiciary with personnel
who have been judged competent to perform the particular
tasks that they will be expected to perform. Just as important,
we believe that those parties who bring their disputes to the
federal courts of appeals have a legitimate expectation that
the judges before whom they appear will have been chosen
based upon their qualifications and capacity to dispense appellate justice. 248 As long as district judges are to be assigned
appellate responsibilities, it is incumbent upon the appointing
authorities to assess each nominee's qualifications to perform
the appellate function in addition to the trial, function. Reliance upon district judges to meet the perceived caseload crisis
in the circuit courts represents a form of appellate justice on
the cheap. It would certainly be more costly, at least in terms
of dollars and cents, for Congress to authorize an expansion of
the number of circuit court positions to be filled by persons
purposefully chosen to exercise the federal appellate jurisdiction. 249 But as we have argued, continuation of the current
practice, even if only by default, entails costs of its own. Up
until now, we have seen no evidence that those ultimately
responsible for setting policy for the administration of the
federal courts have directly confronted those costs. It is time
that they did.
·

assign recently appointed district judges to appellate panels as part of their orientation to the federal courts. See supra notes 44--46 and accompanying text. In our
view, a view apparently shared by many district judges with whom we have communicated, this one-time assignment can be quite a valuable educational experience,
and its benefits outweigh the attendant administrative and related costs.
248. To the extent that district judges may be less efficient or less qualified in
performing the appellate function, litigants whose cases are decided by panels
composed of one or more district judges may be both absolutely and relatively
disadvantaged. See supra note 243 and accompanying text for a discussion of
problems with district court judge's efficiency while sitting by designation.
249. According to figures reported by Professor Baker, it costs approximately
$630,000 to create a new circuit judgeship and over $800,000 per year to maintain
each position. BAKER, supra ·note 3, at 203. Baker concludes that "[e]ven on the
national order of magnitude, delivering a large litter of new circuit judgeships is an
expensive proposition over time." Id.

